



Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of 
Allotment-Era Settlers 
Ann E. Tweedy* 
“[T]he feeling [among non-Indians in the vicinity of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation] is that the Indian is fair game for anyone 
who can hit the mark . . . .” 
–Superintendent Thomas J. King, March 25, 19121 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the allotment era, the federal government took land from 
tribes and parceled some of it out to individual tribal members, while, in 
most cases, selling off the remainder to non-Indian settlers. Those actions, 
which are properly understood as unconstitutional takings, have been 
reinforced through decades of Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the 
Court has used the now repudiated federal allotment policy, which con-
templated eventual abolition of tribal governments, to justify contempo-
rary incursions on tribal jurisdictional authority as well as other limitations 
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on tribal sovereign rights. In this way, the Court builds new injustices 
upon old ones.  
This Article responds to this Supreme Court precedent with two 
main points. First, it shows that non-Indians at the time had notice that the 
allotment policy was unfair to tribes (and that they sometimes directly 
advocated for its injustices). From this information, I argue that 
non-Indian purchasers of tribal lands—and subsequent purchasers from 
them—should not be understood to have had justifiable expectations that 
the reservations would disappear and that they therefore could not be 
subject to tribal jurisdiction in the future. Second, I argue that the Supreme 
Court should stop using the troubled history of allotment, which it con-
strues based on incomplete information and without taking account of 
tribal interests and perspectives, to justify further restrictions on tribal 
sovereignty. In the late 1800s, the federal government embarked on a 
program of taking communally held tribal lands and redistributing some of 
the taken lands to individual Indians to force Indians to espouse a white 
understanding of property rights. Remaining “surplus” reservation lands 
were usually sold off to whites.2 This allotment of tribal lands was part of 
a broader scheme to assimilate Indians, the overarching goal of which was 
to “kill the Indian . . . and save the man.”3 Allotment was halted in 1934, 
but not before tribes had lost a total of 90 million of the 138 million acres 
they had held at the beginning of the allotment period.4 The allotment 
process left affected reservations in complicated, checkerboard patterns of 
Indian and non-Indian ownership, which continue to interfere with effec-
tive governance of such reservations and to cause considerable jurisdic-
tional confusion today. These difficulties are due, in large part, to the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to hold that tribes have jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, despite federal law to the contrary.5 Moreover, as discussed 
                                                 
 2. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (1886); FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL 
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N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 980 (2011). 
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(2004) (discussing the Indian Country Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Su-
preme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of 
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below, the Supreme Court frequently invokes, both explicitly and implic-
itly, the justifiable expectations of non-Indian allotment-era purchasers 
regarding the disappearance of reservations to support its holdings deny-
ing tribal jurisdiction.6 
While the Supreme Court routinely relies on the “justifiable expec-
tations” of non-Indian purchasers to support rulings that are adverse to 
tribes,7 the Court never uses historical sources to unearth the true sub-
stance of these expectations, nor does it explain why they were justifiable. 
These presumed expectations thus form a significant part of the Supreme 
Court’s justification for impeding tribes from effectively governing their 
own reservations, and the Court’s use of these expectations helps to 
maintain an atmosphere of lawlessness on reservations.8 
My purpose in this Article is to question both the substance of these 
presumed expectations and their justifiability. I begin this questioning 
with a thorough analysis of previously unexamined historical newspaper 
articles concerning non-Indian settlement of Indian reservations during 
the allotment era. I then argue that, as reflected by the above quote from 
Superintendent King, most non-Indians during the allotment period cared 
little about whether Indians were treated justly. Furthermore, I argue that 
many non-Indians had notice that tribes were being unjustly deprived of 
their lands through the allotment process, and that some non-Indians even 
advocated for this very injustice to occur. Both notice of injustice and 
complicity in the government’s unjust actions precluded non-Indian pur-
chasers from forming justifiable expectations. This rigorous, con-
text-specific look at non-Indian expectations suggests that, in sharp con-
trast to current Supreme Court practice, tribal jurisdiction over non-
members should generally be upheld and Indian reservations should not 
generally be held to have been diminished or disestablished as a result of 
allotment. 
In examining the history of allotment, I focus on one of the largest 
tribes, the Sioux Nation, which lost over 30 million acres in two early 
cessions to the federal government9 and which continued to lose lands 
                                                                                                             
Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 473 (2003) (same). See generally Royster, 
supra note 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Di-
vestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 57 (1999). 
 7. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 
(2008); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 602–05 (1977); Frickey, supra note 6, at 21–27, 
38, 45, 48, 57. 
 8. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 5, at 684–87, 689–95. 
 9. Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties, and Lakota 
Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 317, 328 (1998) (detailing a loss of 22.8 million acres in 1877); 
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throughout the allotment period. I particularly concentrate on one of its 
constituent tribes, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. As is its practice 
generally when deciding tribal jurisdiction and reservation diminishment 
cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly analyzed and relied upon land 
cessions by constituent tribes of the Sioux Nation in determining whether 
individual Sioux reservations have been diminished and whether these 
tribes have jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations. And the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has been involved in more than its share of 
such cases.10 Moreover, the three poorest counties in the United States 
today are home to Sioux reservations in South Dakota, and one of them 
comprises part of the Cheyenne Sioux Reservation.11 Crime on several of 
these reservations is literally epidemic.12 Both the widespread poverty on 
these reservations and their lawless character can be linked to the now 
repudiated allotment policy.13 
Part II of this Article explains the substance of the General Allotment 
Act14 (GAA) and the means by which the federal government imple-
mented both the GAA and the broader federal allotment policy. Part III 
describes the Supreme Court’s current use of the repudiated allotment 
policy, including reliance on non-Indian expectations, in deciding cases 
on tribal jurisdiction and reservation boundaries. Based largely on my own 
original historical research, Part IV first delineates the substance of 
non-Indian expectations during the allotment era—especially with regard 
to purchases of Sioux lands—and then assesses the justifiability of these 
                                                                                                             
Herbert T. Hoover, The Sioux Agreement of 1889 and its Aftermath, 19 S.D. HIST. 56, 68 (1989) 
(describing loss of over nine million acres in 1889). 
 10. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 316 (addressing the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe’s civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian business); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) 
(addressing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s civil regulatory jurisdiction over a portion of tribal lands 
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(1984) (holding that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s reservation was not diminished); Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 584 (holding the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s reservation to have been dimin-
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23, 2012), http://www.keloland.com/NewsDetail6162.cfm?Id=0,126667. 
 12. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Gang Violence Grows on an Indian Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/us/14gangs.html?pagewanted=all (describing vio-
lence on the Pine Ridge Reservation, which is home to the Oglala Sioux); Laura Sullivan, Lawmakers 
Move to Curb Rape on Native Lands, NPR, May 3, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ sto-
ry.php?storyId=103717296 (discussing rape on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation). 
 13. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 9, at 80–83, 89–90 (describing how implementation of the 
allotment policy led to extreme poverty among both the Indians of the Crow Creek Reservation and 
those of Pine Ridge); Tweedy, supra note 5, at 690–91 (linking lawlessness on reservations to the 
complex jurisdictional maze that governs criminal jurisdiction on reservations and that stems in 
significant part from the Supreme Court’s concern about tribal jurisdiction on reservations containing 
large numbers of non-Indians and checkerboard land ownership patterns). 
 14. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1886). 
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expectations under several distinct tests. Finally, Part IV ultimately con-
cludes that any non-Indian expectations that may have existed regarding 
the disappearance of reservations and the consequent foreclosure of any 
possibility of tribal jurisdiction were, most likely, not justifiable. 
II. THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
The allotment period of federal Indian policy lasted roughly from the 
1880s through the 1920s,15 and its centerpiece was the GAA.16 Enacted in 
1887, the GAA—also known as the Dawes Act—was an attempt to for-
cibly assimilate Indians by breaking up tribal land holdings and distrib-
uting allotments of the land to individual Indians.17 The federal policy 
reflected in the GAA contemplated the eventual “transformation of Indian 
people into United States citizens with the corresponding disappearance of 
tribes and reservations.”18 Under the GAA, different amounts of acreage 
were distributed to individual Indians depending on family status and age, 
with larger amounts going to heads of household, smaller amounts going 
to single persons and orphans, and the smallest amounts going to 
non-orphaned minor children. 19  The GAA established congressional 
policy regarding allotment and specified a general procedure. That policy 
was then implemented by individual statutes that pertained to specific 
reservations.20 The allotments were initially to be held in trust by the 
federal government for the benefit of the individual Indian owner for a 
period of twenty-five years, after which the Indian owner would hold the 
land in fee and be free to alienate it.21 But the pressure to create opportu-
nities for non-Indians to acquire tribal lands led to multiple legislative and 
administrative attacks on this trust period. These attacks were imple-
mented at various points until allotment efforts were formally terminated, 
and the allotment policy repudiated, in 1934.22 
                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Griz-
zlies and Things like That?” How the Second Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal 
Self-Defense, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687, 709 (2011). 
 16. 24 Stat. 388. 
 17. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 2, at 9–10; see also Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving 
the Supreme Court’s Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 
147, 189–90 (2000). 
 18. See Hoover, supra note 9, at 63 (describing the prevailing federal policy in the 1880s); id. at 
65 (describing the policy of the GAA). 
 19. § 1, 24 Stat. 388. 
 20. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 16.03[2][b]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 9, at 79–81; Royster, supra note 2, at 10–12; see also COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 16.03[2][c]. 
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Under the allotment policy, reservation lands that remained after 
individual Indians received their allotments were considered “surplus” 
lands and were, at least under initial plans, to be purchased from the tribes 
and then sold off to white settlers.23 While the GAA itself provided for 
tribal consent for the government’s purchase of surplus lands and its 
subsequent sale of them to non-Indian settlers, Congress soon became 
frustrated with tribes’ refusals to sell surplus lands in some cases and their 
demands for high prices in others.24 Accordingly, once the Supreme Court 
proclaimed Congress’s right to unilaterally abrogate its treaties with In-
dian tribes in a now infamous 1903 case, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,25 
Congress began to ignore the GAA’s requirement of tribal consent for the 
sale of surplus lands. Congress similarly ignored the GAA’s provision that 
such lands be purchased from tribes prior to being sold off to non-Indians, 
as well as the treaty provisions that protected tribes’ land rights in many 
cases.26 Reservations that were opened to white settlement in the throes of 
this newfound congressional freedom included the Rosebud Sioux Res-
ervation in South Dakota, the Crow Reservation in Montana, the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation in Utah, the Flathead Reservation in Montana, the 
Wind River Reservation in Wyoming, the Spirit Lake Reservation in 
North Dakota, and the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Reser-
vations in South Dakota.27 
By the time the allotment policy was repudiated in 1934, a total of 90 
million acres of formerly tribal land had passed into non-Indian hands, and 
the total Indian land base had shrunk from 138 million acres to 48 million 
acres.28 These losses reflect sales of surplus reservation lands and loss of 
Indian allotments after issuance of fee patents to individual owners, with 
allotment losses occurring through tax foreclosures, mortgages, sales, and 
other means.29 The rates of loss on many reservations were even more 
                                                 
 23. § 5, 24 Stat. 388; see also Royster, supra note 2, at 13. 
 24. HOXIE, supra note 2, at 156; Royster, supra note 2, at 13. 
 25. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
 26. HOXIE, supra note 2, at 156–58; Royster, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
 27. HOXIE, supra note 2, at 156–58, 164–65. Note that the Spirit Lake Tribe was formerly called 
the Devil’s Lake Tribe. See, e.g., The History and Culture of the Mni Wakan Oyate (Spirit Lake 
Nation), N.D. STUD., http://www.ndstudies.org/resources/IndianStudies/spiritlake/gov_contem 
porary.html (last visited June 27, 2012). 
 28. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 1.04. 
 29. Royster, supra note 2, at 12–13. Notably, in light of failing agricultural economies and 
federal policy of forcibly decreasing Indians’ dependence on the government, it appears that Indian 
allotment owners were often forced to sell their allotments to feed their families. Hoover, supra note 9, 
at 80–82 (describing the situation on the Crow Creek Reservation in the 1910s); see also id. at 89–90 
(describing the Oglala Sioux’s consumption of their livestock after their formerly thriving livestock 
industry was severely damaged by a storm in 1913 and after the Tribe faced decreased federal rations). 
2012] Unjustifiable Expectations 135 
striking than the composite number reflects. For instance, on the Chey-
enne River Sioux Reservation, a full seventy-five percent of patentees lost 
their allotments within a span of a few years and, on other reservations, 
patentees suffered even greater rates of loss.30 
Part and parcel of the idea that Congress could ignore both the more 
protective provisions of the GAA and treaty provisions protecting tribal 
property rights was a sentiment of blatant disregard of tribal property 
rights. While this sentiment was hardly a new product of the allotment 
era—indeed, it dates back to European colonization of North Ameri-
ca31—it was certainly in full force during the allotment period.32 For 
example, one congressman in 1896 rhetorically asserted that the Crow 
Tribe had no genuine right to its own land because the Tribe failed to use it 
in an economically beneficial way: “How . . . can [the Indian] have more 
than a possession of title simply by making moccasin tracks over it with 
his bow and arrow?”33 Then, in 1901, Senator Platt argued against rati-
fying an agreement with the Rosebud Sioux Tribe that would have com-
pensated the Tribe for its surplus lands at the bargained-for rate of $2.50 
per acre by stating, “[W]hen we make an Indian tribe rich, . . . we delay its 
civilization.” 34  He further expounded that those Indians having “no 
money, no funds, no land, [and] no annuities” were “the easiest Indians in 
the country to civilize.”35 His ideas were eventually implemented in the 
                                                 
 30. See, e.g., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 53 (Bruce E. Johansen & Barry 
M. Pritzker eds., 2008). 
 31. See, e.g., ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES & COMMENTARY 
22–24 (2008). 
 32. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 9, at 60 (“Most politicians representing white constituents in 
southern Dakota insisted that the opening of more land for settlement, by whatever means necessary, 
was essential for territorial development . . . , and they expressed no concern about the consequence 
for Indians.” (emphasis added)); id. at 64 (describing federal officials’ initial decision to circumvent 
the treaty requirement that three-fourths of the adult male citizens of the Sioux Nation consent to any 
treaty modification so as to satisfy white constituents); HOXIE, supra note 1, app. 81, at 3 (containing 
the March 1912 response of the Superintendent of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation to a ques-
tionnaire by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in which the Superintendent stated that “white men . 
. . in the vicinity of this reservation care very little about the Indian, except for what gain they can 
make of him”); id. app. 81, at 5 (“There seems to be a very decided sentiment with the Grand Jury 
against indicting homesteaders for stealing Indian timber.”); id. (stating that “the feeling is that the 
Indian is game for anyone who can hit the mark”); id. app. 81, at 13 (discussing a pending or recently 
passed bill and protesting that “[i]f the Congress . . . desired to make a present to the homesteaders in 
this country . . . the price of the present should have come out of the public moneys and not out of the 
funds of [the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe]”); see also Hoover, supra note 9, at 73 (tying non-Indians’ 
allotment-era belief that tribes had no right to retain the lands that they were not cultivating to the 
views of a then-popular European philosopher, Emer de Vattel). 
 33. HOXIE, supra note 2, at 156 (alteration in original). 
 34. Id. at 156. 
 35. Id. at 156–57. 
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1904 Rosebud Act, which proclaimed, with a very limited exception, that 
“the United States shall in no manner be bound to purchase any portion of 
the land.”36 Such ideas reflected a changing official view of tribal prop-
erty: from that of a “birthright” of tribes and Indians to an understanding 
of tribal lands as simply “a part of the public domain”—a conception that 
took no account of tribal rights at all.37 
The tribal rights disregarded during allotment included communally 
held tribal land rights and treaty rights, the latter qualifying as tribal 
property rights in their own right.38 Non-consensual allotments of tribal 
lands, under which land was forcibly taken from tribes and redistributed to 
individual Indians, constituted uncompensated takings of tribal lands be-
cause, while individual Indians received something of value, the tribe that 
owned the land did not. 39  Similarly, non-consensual alienation of 
so-called surplus lands to white settlers also constituted an unconstitu-
tional taking because of the lack of a permissible public purpose for the 
taking (in addition to the fact that some tribes did not receive fair market 
value).40 
The taking of tribal lands as “surplus” was justified at the time by the 
notion that “Indians owned more land than they needed,” and such takings 
have since been described as “a huge form of affirmative action for white 
people.”41 While the comparison between sales of surplus lands and af-
firmative action for whites is a potent metaphor, it is an understatement 
given that extant real property rights in the United States have never been 
seen as an appropriate target for affirmative action programs.42 Rather, 
such takings are better understood as a form of persecution in line with 
other shameful acts in Western history, like the Canadian government’s 
confiscation of many Japanese-Canadians’ property after the bombing of 
                                                 
 36. 33 Stat. 258 (1904); HOXIE, supra note 2, at 157. 
 37. HOXIE, supra note 2, at 161. 
 38. See generally Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a 
“Mere Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37 (2002); see also Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (describing a tribe’s treaty-protected hunting and 
fishing rights as property rights). 
 39. Singer, supra note 38, at 44–45. 
 40. Id. at 46–47. 
 41. Id. at 47; see also Hoover, supra note 9, at 73–74 (describing non-Indians’ allotment-era 
belief that Indians should not be able to retain more land than they could utilize); Kirkwood’s Report, 
MINN. TRIB., Dec. 7. 1881, at 3 (advocating for allotment of Indian reservations generally and sug-
gesting that “[t]he reservations set apart by treaty, or law, or executive order, have been usually many 
times larger than necessary . . . for the support of the tribes placed thereon”). 
 42. See, e.g., Gregory Camilli & Kevin G. Welner, Is There a Mismatch Effect in Law School, 
Why Might it Arise, and What Would it Mean?, 37 J.C. & U.L. 491, 494 (2011) (describing the three 
“main contexts” for affirmative action programs in the United States, both historically and currently, 
as contracting, higher education admissions, and hiring); accord Singer, supra note 38, at 47. 
2012] Unjustifiable Expectations 137 
Pearl Harbor43 and the historical denial of property rights to married 
women in the United States and England,44 to name only two. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT RELIANCE ON THE GAA AND THE 
EXPECTATIONS IT ENGENDERED 
Despite the allotment policy’s long-ago repudiation—and its con-
stitutionally and morally troubling aspects—the Supreme Court continues 
to give it considerable weight in deciding issues of tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. The Court also relies on the policy in deciding the related 
issue of whether allotment and the concomitant selling off of surplus lands 
to non-Indians legally effected a diminishment (or disestablishment) of a 
given tribe’s reservation.45 As further discussed below, the Court’s focus 
on allotment in these contexts constitutes an attempt to give effect to 
non-Indians’ presumed justifiable expectations.46 
Thus, we see the Supreme Court discussing the allotment policy and 
explicitly or implicitly relying on the fact that a reservation has been al-
lotted in determining that a tribe lacks jurisdiction over nonmembers in 
various contexts. For example, in its “pathmarking”47 tribal civil juris-
diction case, Montana v. United States,48 the Supreme Court relied on the 
fact that much of the land within the Crow Reservation was alienated to 
non-Indians through allotment and sale of surplus lands in holding that the 
Crow Tribe lacked authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on 
lands owned in fee by non-Indians: 
The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
repeatedly emphasized that the allotment policy was designed to 
eventually eliminate tribal relations. . . . And throughout the con-
gressional debates on the subject of allotment, it was assumed that 
the “civilization” of the Indian population was to be accomplished, in 
part, by the dissolution of tribal relations. 
. . . . 
There is simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress 
intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon alienated al-
                                                 
 43. See, e.g., Linda McKay-Panos, Post 9/11 Legislation and Policy in Cana-
da–Neo-McCarthyism?, 54 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 178, 182 (2005). Similarly, in the United States, 
the federal and state governments inflicted many injustices on Japanese-Americans and Japanese 
nationals in the wake of the bombing. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
 44. See, e.g., 2-12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 12.03 (David A. Thomas ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
 45. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 6, at 25, 38, 57; see also Tweedy, supra note 17, at 189–94 
(discussing the Court’s reliance on allotment in tribal jurisdiction cases). 
 46. Frickey, supra note 6, at 25–26. 
 47. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). 
 48. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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lotted lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. Indeed, 
throughout the congressional debates, allotment of Indian land was 
consistently equated with the dissolution of tribal affairs and juris-
diction. . . . It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would 
intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become 
subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allot-
ment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government. And it 
is hardly likely that Congress could have imagined that the purpose 
of peaceful assimilation could be advanced if fee-holders could be 
excluded from fishing or hunting on their acquired property. 
The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was, of 
course, repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 
984, at 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. But what is relevant in this case is the 
effect of the land alienation occasioned by that policy on Indian 
treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation of reservation land.49 
Thus, while the Montana Court does not directly reference the ex-
pectations of non-Indian settlers, the Court bases its rejection of tribal 
jurisdiction largely on the intent of the repudiated allotment policy, and 
correctly points out (although the point is arguably irrelevant in the pre-
sent day, given the policy’s repudiation)50 that the Congress that enacted 
the policy would not have intended tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers to 
continue. Indeed, allotment is a common theme in Supreme Court cases 
regarding tribal civil51 and criminal jurisdiction52 from the Rehnquist era 
through the present. Moreover, the policy’s effects, and the intent of spe-
cific allotment and surplus lands acts, are put even more directly at issue in 
reservation diminishment and disestablishment cases.53 
The late Professor Phil Frickey has insightfully linked the Court’s 
continued focus on allotment and its ongoing implementation of the policy 
to its concern for the justifiable expectations of non-Indian residents of 
                                                 
 49. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9 (citations omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 17, at 191–94; Frickey, supra note 6, at 25–26. 
 51. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328–32 
(2008) (discussing allotment in a case involving a tribal court’s jurisdiction to hear a tribal-law tort 
claim brought against a non-Indian-owned bank); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 422–25, 436–40 (1989) (Stevens, J., plurality) (White, J., 
plurality) (discussing and relying on the allotment policy in a case regarding tribal on-reservation 
zoning authority). 
 52. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 & n.1 (1978) (discussing the effects 
of allotment in a case about tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Frickey, supra note 6, at 
36–38 (discussing Oliphant and how the allotment of the Suquamish Tribe’s reservation apparently 
influenced the Court’s decision). 
 53. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 602–05 (1977); see also Frickey, 
supra note 6, at 21–27, 48, 57 (discussing the Supreme Court’s diminishment cases). 
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Indian reservations.54 With this link as my starting point, I question the 
Court’s inference that the allotment policy has given rise to justifiable 
expectations on the part of non-Indians. I first piece together from his-
torical sources the expectations that might have been engendered by the 
allotment policy in general and the opening of specific reservations (such 
as the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation) for non-Indian settlement. 
Second, using historical and legal sources, I question whether non-Indian 
purchasers’ expectations—both as pieced together from historical sources 
and as constructed by the Supreme Court55—should be considered justi-
fiable. If these expectations were not justifiable, there would seem to be 
little reason to give them weight today. While the Court’s focus on justi-
fiable expectations has been criticized by other legal scholars,56 no one 
has yet taken an empirical look at allotment-era historical sources to de-
termine what settlers’ expectations might actually have been, nor has 
anyone used this type of historical information to analyze whether such 
settler expectations should be enforced. 
A. Methodology 
Because my focus was the Sioux Nation’s land cessions, I primarily 
concentrated on Midwestern newspapers. I used online sources of histor-
ical news articles available from libraries, as well as from the Library of 
Congress’s newspaper digitization project, Chronicling America. Addi-
tionally, I used some microfilm sources, including Saint Paul Pioneer 
Press and various South Dakota newspapers available at the South Dakota 
State Archives. With the electronic resources, I searched the dates com-
prising the allotment period broadly. With microfilm sources available 
from the South Dakota State Archives, I concentrated on important date 
ranges for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, focusing primarily on the 
spring of 1908 through 1910, but also looking briefly at May and June 
1875, May 1889, and June, July, and August 1904.57 I spent the bulk of 
my time at the South Dakota State Archives examining a local weekly 
                                                 
 54. Frickey, supra note 6, at 21–22, 25–26, 38, 45, 49, 57. 
 55. I have criticized the Supreme Court’s continued reliance on such presumed expectations in 
previous work. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 5, at 707 & n.273 (suggesting that such expectations 
have been long-since fulfilled and that most of the purchasers who held them are likely deceased). 
 56. See generally Frickey supra note 6; Ezra Rosser, Protecting Non-Indians from Harm? The 
Property Consequences of Indians, 87 OR. L. REV. 175 (2008); Judith V. Royster, Montana at the 
Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006). 
 57. Unfortunately, much of the microfilm I looked at from 1875 was partially illegible or com-
pletely illegible. My research assistant, Stef Hedlund, examined the St. Paul Pioneer Press microfilm. 
Using the dates of other useful articles as guidelines, she looked at date ranges in the period 1908 
through 1910. 
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newspaper called the Ashton Chronicle because such a newspaper would 
have likely contained distilled information that would have been widely 
available to the citizens of South Dakota and nearby states and territories 
at the time.58 
In addition to the news articles being both a source that settlers may 
have actually viewed and a representative source in the sense of being a 
repository of widely available information, those news articles that de-
scribe settler attempts to influence the government to take land from tribes 
also provide direct evidence of non-Indian participation in the violation of 
tribal land rights. 
Analyzing historical census data in conjunction with statistics on 
historical newspaper circulation shows that a very significant percentage 
of the settler population read newspapers during the allotment era. For 
instance, according to the census, the total population of the United States 
in 1910, including outlying possessions, was 101,115,487,59 whereas the 
total newspaper circulation in 1909 was 58,505,000.60 Thus, the total 
circulation equaled about fifty-eight percent of the population during that 
time. This does not mean that fifty-eight percent of people read newspa-
pers because one person may have read several newspapers, and, con-
versely, an entire family may have relied on a single copy of a newspaper. 
But the bare numbers do suggest that newspapers were widely read in 
1909 and 1910. The data from earlier years is not as striking but still 
suggests significant readership. In 1900, for example, the total daily 
newspaper circulation was 15,102,00061 and the total population was 
76,239,795,62 which means that total circulation comprised about twenty 
percent of the population. 
                                                 
 58. By current routes, Ashton is a little over one hundred miles from the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation border; thus, it is in the same part of the state as the reservation but still at a distance that 
would have undoubtedly been viewed as considerable in the early 1900s. This degree of distance 
probably meant that Ashton residents were unlikely to have been privy to local information about the 
Tribe not widely available elsewhere, but that happenings of the reservation would have been close 
enough to have been of interest to them. 
 59. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 22, tbl. 1 
(1910), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1910.html. 
 60. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970 ch. R, ser. R 244–57 (1975), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/ 
documents/CT1970p2-05.pdf. 
 61. Id. Because the only number for newspaper circulation in 1900 available from this source is 
for “Daily Circulation,” the number for daily circulation has been used as the total circulation number. 
The total circulation of newspapers in 1900, however, was probably significantly greater than the daily 
circulation number reflects. 
 62. WILLIAM R. MERRIAM, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED 
STATES xix, tbl. 3 (1900), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1900.html. 
This total population number is comprised of the sum of the table entries for states and organized 
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B. Direct Invocations of Non-Indian Purchasers’ Justifiable Expectations 
As discussed above, whenever the Court relies on allotment policies 
to decide a contemporary issue about tribal jurisdiction or reservation 
boundaries, it is implicitly giving effect to non-Indians’ presumed justi-
fiable expectations.63 The issue of justifiable expectations also comes up 
more directly in some jurisdiction and related cases, and it has often been a 
central theme in the diminishment cases. 
For instance, the notion of justifiable non-Indian expectations was 
referenced in the Supreme Court’s most recent case on tribal civil juris-
diction, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.64 
Writing for the majority in Long Family Land & Cattle, which held that 
the Cheyenne River Sioux tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a 
non-Indian-owned, off-reservation bank in a tort action, Justice Roberts 
alluded to such allotment-era purchasers’ justifiable expectations: 
[I]t “defies common sense to suppose” that Congress meant to sub-
ject non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction simply by virtue of the non-
member’s purchase of land in fee simple . . . . If Congress did not 
anticipate tribal jurisdiction would run with the land, we see no 
reason why a nonmember would think so either.65 
This language from Long Family Land & Cattle evinces a concern 
that the original non-Indian purchasers of Cheyenne River Sioux reserva-
tion land were not on notice of the possibility that tribal jurisdiction would 
be asserted over them in the future—a possibility that was arguably in-
compatible with the prevailing federal policy of the time. Implicit in this 
concern is the notion that subjecting such purchasers to tribal jurisdiction 
would conflict with their justifiable expectations. In effect, the Court ap-
pears to treat the potential for tribal jurisdiction as a putative equitable 
servitude that cannot be enforced because of the original non-Indian 
purchasers’ utter lack of notice.66 
                                                                                                             
territories, Indian territories and reservations, and Hawaii; Alaska is excluded because it was not yet a 
territory. Id.; Alaska, ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (Grolier Online ed. 2012). 
 63. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 21–22, 25–26, 38, 45, 49, 57. 
 64. 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
 65. Id. at 337 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 66. The use of the phrase “run with the land” evokes the law of real covenants and equitable 
servitudes. See, e.g., 1-60 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.01 (Michael Allan Wolf Desk ed., 2009); 
7-61 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 44, § 61.02(b). For further illustrations of how 
Supreme Court Justices and scholars have linked tribal rights to real covenants and equitable servi-
tudes, see Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 442 
(1989) (Stevens, J., plurality) (characterizing tribal zoning authority in an area of the reservation that 
maintained its Indian character as an “equitable servitude”); Singer, supra note 38, at 46 (describing a 
tribe’s treaty right that its lands not be taken by the government unless three-fourths of the adult male 
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In another recent jurisdiction case, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation,67 the Court more explicitly invokes non-Indians’ justifiable ex-
pectations.68 City of Sherrill was in fact about local jurisdiction to tax a 
tribe’s on-reservation property that had been reacquired by the tribe after a 
prolonged absence. Thus, tribal jurisdiction was not at issue in the case at 
all. But the Court’s trepidation about the Nation’s potential future asser-
tion of regulatory jurisdiction was palpable and appears to have largely 
motivated the Court to rule against tribal tax immunity, and thus implicitly 
against any possible future assertions of tribal regulatory authority69—at 
least unless explicitly sanctioned by the federal government.70 In City of 
Sherrill, the Court specifically analogized the question of tribal tax im-
munity to reservation diminishment and noted that the “justifiable ex-
pectations” of non-Indians were similarly at issue in City of Sherrill’s 
unusual context, given the State’s “two centuries . . . of exercise of regu-
latory jurisdiction, until recently uncontested by” the Oneida Indian Na-
tion.71 Indeed, the Court described the case as if it were actually about 
tribal jurisdiction: 
[T]he unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sover-
eign control, even over land purchased at the market price, would 
have disruptive practical consequences similar to those that led this 
Court in Yankton Sioux [a diminishment case] to initiate the impos-
sibility doctrine. The city of Sherrill and Oneida County are today 
overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians. . . . A checkerboard of 
alternating state and tribal jurisdiction in New York State—created 
unilaterally at OIN’s behest—would “seriously burde[n] the admin-
istration of state and local governments” and would adversely affect 
landowners neighboring the tribal patches.72 
Putting aside the questionable negative cast in which the Court paints 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers73 (a portrayal that I have criticized in 
                                                                                                             
members of the tribe agreed as “in effect a real covenant attached to the land”); see also Tweedy, 
supra note 17, at 164–65 (criticizing Justice Stevens’s characterization in Brendale, 492 U.S. at 442 
(Stevens, J., plurality), of tribal sovereignty as merely an attribute of tribal property rights). 
 67. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 215. 
 69. Id. at 215–20. But see Rosser, supra note 56, at 209–17 (focusing on decreasing property 
values as the primary harm feared by non-Indians who stood to be impacted by a potential tribal 
success in City of Sherrill). 
 70. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220–21. 
 71. Id. at 215–16. 
 72. Id. at 219–20 (citations omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 6, at 26 (elucidating the Court’s negative assumptions about 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers based on an analysis of earlier cases); see also Rosser, supra note 
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previous work74), this passage reflects the Court’s preoccupation with the 
possibility of future tribal assertions of regulatory jurisdiction. Further, it 
reflects the Court’s assumption that tribal regulatory jurisdiction would 
run counter to the expectations of non-Indians who purchased tribal lands 
after the State itself purchased them from the Oneida Nation in direct 
violation of federal law.75 Thus, at the risk of sounding melodramatic, in 
City of Sherrill, the Court is effectively having a nightmare about future 
assertions of tribal regulatory jurisdiction. And a large part of its night-
mare involves disruption of non-Indians’ justifiable expectations. 
In tribal jurisdiction and related cases, then, the “justifiable expec-
tations” of non-Indians are often raised obliquely through reference to the 
GAA. They also sometimes come up more directly, as in Long Family 
Land & Cattle, in suppositions about whether non-Indian purchasers ex-
pected tribal jurisdiction to run with the land during the allotment era, and 
they are occasionally raised even more directly, as in City of Sherrill, 
where the Court explicitly relied on diminishment cases. 
Furthermore, as stated above, justifiable expectations tend to be an 
explicit and central concern in cases about whether a given reservation has 
been diminished (or disestablished) as a result of the opening of its lands 
for settlement by non-Indians.76 Thus, in Hagen v. Utah,77 which held 
that the Uintah Reservation in Utah had been diminished as a result of 
Congress’s having opened it for settlement by non-Indians, the Court 
states that a conclusion that the reservation had not been diminished 
“would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in 
the area,” given Utah’s longstanding practice of exercising jurisdiction 
and the demographics of the opened area, which was eighty-five percent 
non-Indian at the time of the decision.78 Likewise, the Court in Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe described South Dakota’s longstanding exercise of jurisdic-
tion over that reservation’s opened area and the area’s current de-
mographics—namely, the fact that ninety percent of those living in the 
opened area were non-Indian—as having created “justifiable expecta-
                                                                                                             
56, at 189 (discussing “the Court’s unfounded ease in repetitively assuming injury to non-Indians if 
the Oneida reasserted sovereignty over purchased land”). 
 74. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 5, at 682–83. 
 75. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Ob-
ligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 606–07 (2006). 
 76. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 
584, 604–05 (1977); Frickey, supra note 6, at 21 (discussing Hagen); see also id. at 25–26 (arguing 
that a concern with justifiable expectations is generally at work in the Court’s diminishment juris-
prudence). 
 77. 510 U.S. 399. 
 78. Id. at 421. 
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tions” that the Court should not disrupt. 79  Thus, a concern with 
non-Indians’ “justifiable expectations” motivates the Court in both the 
diminishment and tribal jurisdiction cases, although the concern is more 
often explicitly stated in the diminishment context. 
IV. SETTLER EXPECTATIONS AND THEIR JUSTIFIABILITY 
A. The Timeframe of Expectations 
The Court has been inconsistent in its approach to the timeframe 
within which it assesses expectations. In tribal jurisdiction cases, such as 
Montana and Long Family Land & Cattle, the Court looks back to the era 
of allotment to assess what it imagines might have been the initial 
non-Indian purchasers’ justifiable expectations.80  In the diminishment 
cases, however, the Court appears to be looking more to the expectations 
of contemporary non-Indian reservation residents, or at least including 
their presumed expectations in its assessment. For example, in Hagen, the 
Court refers to “the justifiable expectations of the people living in the 
area,”81 and, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the Court asserts less precisely that 
the State’s “longstanding assumption of jurisdiction [over the area] . . . has 
created justifiable expectations.”82 Thus, the Court alternates between 
eras depending on the issue at hand when it assesses justifiable expecta-
tions. 
Admittedly, trying to determine non-Indian reservation residents’ 
likely expectations from the allotment era through the present would be a 
tall order. But from the standpoint of notice, it would seem to be the initial 
non-Indian purchasers—not the current non-Indian residents of a reser-
vation—whose expectations should be assessed. The original non-Indian 
purchasers of surplus lands during allotment were the ones who could 
most plausibly claim to have changed their positions in reliance on al-
lotment. In other words, the Court should focus on the expectations of 
those who bought and settled land allegedly based in part on the mistaken 
view that the reservations and the tribes who governed them were about to 
disappear forever. 
But federal policy had changed dramatically by 1934. As of 1934, 
when Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 83  non-Indian 
                                                 
 79. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 604–05. 
 80. See also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 & n.1 (1978) (discussing 
allotment in a case concerning tribal criminal jurisdiction). 
 81. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421. 
 82. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 604–05. 
 83. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2012). 
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buyers were on notice that the federal government had put an end to al-
lotment and would actively support the governance efforts of tribal gov-
ernments.84 And while Congress entered another—this time brief—period 
of hostility toward tribal governments in the late 1940s and 1950s,85 this 
period should be viewed as having little relevance to issues of tribal ju-
risdiction because, in 1948, Congress had explicitly separated the issue of 
reservation land ownership from tribal jurisdiction by defining “Indian 
country” to include all lands within the boundary of any reservation, re-
gardless of land ownership—a definition that still stands today.86 More-
over, Congress currently supports tribal self-determination and has con-
sistently done so since the 1970s.87 Even the Supreme Court recognizes 
the possibility of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in recent opinions 
and sometimes upholds it.88 Thus, land buyers and others who have ac-
quired, or simply entered reservation land, in the past few decades were on 
notice of the possibility of tribal jurisdiction. Only allotment-era buyers, 
then, were arguably under a congressionally supported misapprehension 
about the future of tribal governments and the potential jurisdictional 
implications of that future. Therefore, I focus my analysis primarily on 
historical sources from the allotment era to piece together non-Indian 
purchasers’ expectations. Additionally, I examine newspaper articles re-
garding a land cession that occurred just before the allotment era, namely 
the taking of the Black Hills. 
B. What Historical Sources Suggest About Non-Indian Expectations 
The numerous historical newspaper articles I looked at from the al-
lotment era and the smattering from the preceding decade present a mixed 
view of the sale of surplus lands and the allotment policy generally. As 
shown below, many of the articles are geared toward encouraging settlers 
to buy surplus land on reservations and thus focus on the type of land 
available, rather than on how it was obtained from the tribes to whom it 
                                                 
 84. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 15–16; Royster, supra note 2, at 16–18, 62. Apparently, occa-
sional exceptions were administratively made to the Indian Reorganization Act’s firm prohibition on 
further allotments, although such allotments were presumably held in trust indefinitely, and therefore 
were not alienated to non-Indians. See Hoover, supra note 9, at 88; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, 
supra note 4, § 15.07[1][a] (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act). 
 85. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the Termination Period). 
 86. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1151). The 
Termination Period alluded to here would undoubtedly have relevance in specific cases, namely for 
those tribes whose relationships with the federal government were terminated during that era. 
 87. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 2, at 66. 
 88. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 5, at 676–83 (discussing several of the Supreme Court’s recent 
cases on tribal civil jurisdiction); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (upholding tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian). 
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belonged. Some of the news stories paint a rosy picture of Indians’ and 
tribes’ purported agreement with the allotment policy and of the benefits 
Indians supposedly obtained as a result of the policy, both of which are 
generally in conflict with more reliable historical sources from that era. 
Many articles, however, reflect a paternalistic, superior attitude toward 
Indians, which appears to reflect the prevailing white attitudes of the day, 
suggesting some complicity on the part of settlers in the disregard of tribal 
rights.89 
More relevantly, several news articles note that the lands at issue 
were treaty-protected tribal lands and therefore comprised federally rec-
ognized property rights. And quite a few articles describe the character of 
the Indians on the given reservations, which undoubtedly would have put 
buyers on notice that they were moving onto a reservation and would thus 
be in somewhat close proximity with Indians, and, from this information, 
they could have reasonably inferred that such proximity might affect 
governance and jurisdictional issues.90 Additionally, some articles de-
scribe settler movements to advocate for the opening of reservations,91 
                                                 
 89. See supra note 32 and sources cited therein; see also Rosser, supra note 56, at 216–18 
(questioning the innocence of current non-Indian residents and past purchasers of land within the 
Oneida Indian Nation’s reservation, of which the Nation had been unlawfully dispossessed, and 
arguing that non-Indians’ lack of innocence is relevant to the validity of their expectations). 
 90. See, e.g., Notes, CHI. LIVESTOCK WORLD, Aug. 4, 1904, at 6 (discussing the opening of the 
lands of the Spirit Lake Tribe and describing tribal members in favorable terms); New Lands for 
Settlers.; The Great Sioux Reservation in Southern Dakota to Be Thrown Open, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1883, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0D12FE3C5511738DDDA90994DA405B8 
384F0D3 (noting that the settlers “will be surrounded by” Indians after the dismantling of the Great 
Sioux Reservation). 
 91. See, e.g., Kirkwood’s Report, supra note 41 (“Our people in their march westward have 
surrounded these reservations, and seeing in them large tracts of fertile land withheld from the purpose 
for which they believe it was intended—cultivation—have called upon the executive and legislative 
departments to make new treaties, new laws, and new orders, and these calls have generally been 
heeded.”); Open Every Acre of Reservations: Gamble Bill Does Not Include Enough, It Is Urged: 
Resolution Asks That Strip Along the Missouri Be Included in the Opening of the Cheyenne River and 
Standing Rock Indian Reservation–Residents Are Opposed to It., ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 26. 
1908, at 10 [hereinafter Open Every Acre of Reservations]; see also Hoover, supra note 9, at 63 
(describing the demands of a group of territorial residents who met in Deadwood, South Dakota in 
May 1882 and urged that “‘[s]ecuring the opening of the Sioux Reservation to actual settlers, at the 
earliest possible time,’ . . . would be most beneficial to people in their quest for statehood” and noting 
that their statement was “[t]ypical” during that time period). 
Similarly, it appears that it was common for individuals and families to attempt to illegally ap-
propriate Indian lands on a piecemeal basis during the allotment era. See, e.g., LAURA INGALLS 
WILDER, LITTLE HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE 233–34 (1st ed. 2003) (describing an incipient (and aban-
doned) plan on the part of various tribal groups to drive whites out of Indian country); No School for 
‘Squatters.’; Peculiar Situation in ‘Sooner’ Town in Tripp County., POTTER COUNTY NEWS & 
COURIER, June 11, 1908, at 6 (describing squatters who took up residence on the Rosebud Reservation 
before it was opened); Otis’ Days Numbered: Confidently Asserted That the President Will Soon Make 
a Change: The General Has Been Carrying Measures With Too High a Hand., MINN. TRIB., Sept. 26, 
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and these movements clearly point toward settlers’ complicity in appli-
cable cases in the taking of tribal lands. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, several articles report tribal disagreement with individual res-
ervation openings. 
1. The Appropriation of the Black Hills 
In 1877, before the allotment era had officially begun, the federal 
government violated its treaty with the Sioux Nation and forcibly took the 
Black Hills, a sacred portion of the Great Sioux Reservation. This expro-
priation was motivated by the discovery of gold in the area and the con-
sequent great pressure from non-Indians to open it for non-Indian settle-
ment.92 In the words of one scholar, title to the Black Hills was wrested 
from the Sioux Nation through a federal policy “of open warfare,”93 
which included threats to the Indians that “death and starvation [would] 
stare [them] in the face” should they refuse to cede their sacred lands.94 
The Court of Claims branded the expropriation of the Black Hills as 
probably the most “ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings” to “be 
found in our history.”95 
Newspaper articles of that era confirm that the public understood the 
likelihood that Sioux rights would be violated in the taking of the Black 
Hills. Indeed, in some cases, the articles’ authors seem to support the 
taking and the concomitant violation of tribal property rights. For exam-
ple, a Chicago Daily Tribune article from June 1875 describes the tone of 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in negotiating with the Nation as 
“very blunt and forcible.”96 Furthermore, the article explains that the 
Commissioner told the tribal negotiators that if gold were to be discovered 
in the Black Hills, “they would be forced to give up their title to the Black 
                                                                                                             
1899, at 1 (discussing the fact that settlers were building on lands within the Leech Lake reservation 
prior to its being “offered for sale,” despite a contrary order of the Secretary of the Interior and also 
noting that “[i]t is not expected that the [Interior] department will take any action to eject these par-
ties”); see also infra note 200 (describing squatters’ actions on Pueblo lands). 
 92. See generally Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979), aff’d 
448 U.S. 371 (1980); see also Hoover, supra note 9, at 60 (noting that the treaty provision requiring 
that three-fourths of all adult male Sioux citizens agree to any future cession of treaty-protected land 
“had been ignored” in the United States’ acquisition of the Black Hills). 
 93. New Holy, supra note 9, at 327. 
 94. Id. at 329; see also Tweedy, supra note 15, at 733–34 (discussing the federal government’s 
threat of starvation to the Sioux Nation). 
 95. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 F.2d at 1302. 
 96. Washington. The Sioux and Cheyennes Bid Good-Bye to the Capital. The Government’s 
Ultimatum Made Clear to Them in Brief but Forcible Terms, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 6, 1875, at 13 
[hereinafter CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 6, 1875]. 
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Hills.”97 The term “force” was apparently used in the strongest sense of 
the word, for the article begins with a prediction “that the Sioux, the 
troops, and the gold pioneers are likely to soon exchange shots.”98 The 
article further notes that “[t]he Government expects that . . . the Sioux may 
be compelled to relinquish their treaty right to what are supposed to be the 
demands of advancing civilization.”99 
Another Chicago Daily Tribune article from the previous day reports 
that a Sioux leader, Spotted Tail, first stated that “it was not worthwhile 
talking about the Hills now, as they [the Sioux Nation] would demand a 
very high price.”100 When the Secretary of the Interior insisted upon 
continuing the discussion, weakly noting that, if gold were discovered in 
the Black Hills, “it would be impossible to keep the white people out,” 
Spotted Tail accused the federal government of attempting theft: “Spotted 
Tail said the Great Spirit had told him never to steal anybody’s country 
without paying for it. If you had the same sense of right, we could get 
along well enough.”101 A similar, but very abbreviated, article in a South 
Dakota newspaper from the previous week also reports on Sioux leaders’ 
objections to ceding the Black Hills, albeit in much less detail.102 
These three news stories convey to the public the government’s 
disregard for Sioux property rights, accurately foreshadow the coercive 
character of the eventual sale, and communicate the important information 
that a treaty between the Tribe and the federal government—a property 
right in its own right—stood to be abrogated. One gets a sense in reading 
the articles that the Sioux Nation’s property rights were not regarded as 
entitled to the same respect as whites’ property rights. At a minimum, any 
readers of the articles in the Chicago Daily Tribune, the South Dakota 
newspaper article, or similar articles in other papers who went on to 
purchase land in the Black Hills were on notice of the probability that the 
land was ultimately acquired from the Sioux Nation by less than honorable 
(and, indeed, legally suspect) means. 
                                                 
 97. Id. For an excerpt of another, more general article from this timeframe evincing a disregard 
of tribal property rights, see RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER 
IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 40–41 (1992) (quoting Our Indian Policy, N.Y. WORLD, Jan. 18, 
1874, at 4). 
 98. CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 6, 1875, supra note 96. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. Washington. The Sioux Warriors Fold Their Blankets and Steal Away. Spotted Tail Be-
comes Irate and Expresses his Views in Un-courtly Terms. He Hints the Government is Bound to Rob 
Them of Their Lands, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 5, 1875, at 5 [hereinafter CHI. DAILY TRIB. June 5, 
1875]. 
 101. CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 5, 1875, supra note 100. 
 102. The Past Week. Domestic Intelligence. Washington, DAKOTA REPUBLICAN, June 3, 1875, at 
1. 
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Another South Dakota newspaper article from the same timeframe 
demonstrates complicity on the part of the people of South Dakota in the 
taking of the Black Hills, although it is arguably less direct regarding the 
means to be used than the two Chicago Daily Tribune articles. After re-
counting the progress of the non-Indians in the Territory of Wyoming and 
the State of Nebraska in convincing the government to abrogate tribal 
rights, the article states that the people of Dakota “merely ask” the gov-
ernment to use “all honorable and the most expeditious means to abrogate 
the treaty . . . and extinguish the Indian title to as much of the Black Hills 
as is supposed to abound in mineral wealth.”103 Part of the article is a 
reproduction of a document filed on their behalf with the Secretary of the 
Interior seeking a governmental appropriation of the Black Hills.104 
This article demonstrates that the settlers were, at least to some de-
gree, complicit in the eventual abrogation of the treaty, although arguably 
the request for use of honorable means suggests some measure of com-
punction as to the methods of abrogation.105 The article also recognizes 
the Sioux Nation’s treaty right to the Black Hills as a legal obstacle to 
settler acquisition. 
But not all articles on the appropriation of the Black Hills were as 
descriptive as the four described above. For example, an article in a 
Minnesota newspaper in 1876 recounted that a treaty had been “recently 
made with the Indians at the Red Cloud Agency” and “ratified by those of 
the Spotted Tail Agency” by which “the Black Hills reservation is relin-
quished to civilization.”106 The article makes no mention of the fact that 
the treaty had garnered nowhere near the number of individual Sioux 
signatures necessary to make it legally binding upon the Sioux Nation107 
or of the coercive methods used to procure signatures. But the article does 
report the meager consideration that the Nation received for the cession: 
“certain annuities, rations, transportation, and assistance in farming and 
house building.”108 A reader could certainly infer from that information 
that the Sioux had made a very poor bargain. And readers who were aware 
                                                 
 103. The Black Hills. Pennington and Kidder. What They Ask in the Name of Dakota, Touching 
the Black Hills, DAKOTA REPUBLICAN, June 3, 1875, at 2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. For a shockingly virulent opinion piece also from June 1875 that completely dehumanizes 
Indians, see The Indian Question, DAKOTA REPUBLICAN, June 17, 1875 at 2. While this article does 
not explicitly mention Indian property rights or the Black Hills, it suggests that tribal rights in general 
are mere products of government pampering, that Indians should be subject to the same laws as 
everyone else, and that, if they don’t cease “their fiendish” ways, Indians should be exterminated. Id. 
 106. WINONA DAILY REPUBLICAN, Oct. 2, 1876, at 2. 
 107. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, 2 THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT & THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS 632–33 (1984); New Holy, supra note 9, at 328. 
 108. WINONA DAILY REPUBLICAN, Oct. 2, 1876, supra note 106. 
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of the Sioux’s prior resistance to selling the lands—likely a large per-
centage of people—could logically infer that foul play was a strong pos-
sibility. 
Later, allotment-era news articles that address the taking of the Black 
Hills affirm that the Sioux understood their lands had been wrongfully 
taken.109 Thus, non-Indian buyers of lands in the Black Hills who pur-
chased lands even later during the allotment-era would have been on direct 
notice of a potential tribal claim of some right to the land. 
2. The Dismantlement of the Great Sioux Reservation 
Despite the recent appropriation of the Black Hills, pressure to make 
further inroads onto Sioux lands continued in the 1880s.110 While early 
bills providing for the opening of the Great Sioux Reservation 
failed—largely because of concerns about lack of tribal con- 
sent 111 —eventually the required number of adult males signed the 
agreement to cede over 9 million acres of land and divide themselves onto 
several smaller reservations.112 However, the signatures were coerced: the 
Sioux were told that, if they did not sign, their land would be taken on less 
favorable terms.113 More aggressive tactics included jailing opponents of 
the cession and forbidding influential leaders, such as Sitting Bull, from 
speaking out publicly against the proposal.114 
Moreover, the federal government’s side of the agreement was not 
carried out. Although the Sioux living in the ceded area were guaranteed 
allotments, to be chosen prior to the opening of the reservation, in fact, the 
reservation was opened to non-Indian settlement before any allotments 
were taken, and other provisions of the agreement were also broken.115 
                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Black Hills Country, DAILY ARGUS LEADER, May 26, 1908, at 4; Sioux Go Out for 
Uncle Sam’s Scalp of Gold, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 7, 1923, at 1; Sioux Indians Meet in Big Council: 
Close Corporation Formed on the Six Reservations to Push Claims Against General Government, 
ASHTON CHRON., Aug. 12, 1904, at 5. 
 110. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 107, at 633; Hoover, supra note 9, at 62–63. 
 111. PRUCHA, supra note 107, at 634–38; Hoover, supra note 9, at 64. 
 112. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 107, at 639; John S. Harbison, The Broken Promise Land: An 
Essay on Native American Tribal Sovereignty over Reservation Resources, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 
353 (1995); Hoover, supra note 9, at 65, 68. 
 113. PRUCHA, supra note 107, at 638–39. 
 114. Hoover, supra note 9, at 66–67. In fact, Sitting Bull’s death was related to his opposition to 
the cession, and the federal government’s fear of him and his followers caused not only his own death 
but the many “senseless killings” of Wounded Knee. Id. at 67–69. 
 115. PRUCHA, supra note 107, at 638–40; see also Agreement with the Sioux, March 2, 1889, § 
13 in VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMAILLE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: 
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, & CONVENTIONS, 1775–1979, 310 (1999). 
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Tribes eventually received an average of fifty-seven cents per acre for 
lands relinquished under the 1889 Agreement.116 
The news articles addressing the prospect of breaking up the Great 
Sioux Reservation before the opening actually occurred generally reflect 
lack of tribal agreement with the federal plan to sell off part of the reser-
vation.117 And one article in particular acknowledges that the consent to 
be procured would be “nominal[]” and that all parties understood in ad-
vance “just how it [was] . . . to end.”118 Additionally, in one of the articles, 
the chairman of the commission appointed by President Harrison to pro-
cure the Sioux Nation’s consent to the opening describes the upcoming 
negotiations in brutal, racialized tones: “We will start tomorrow night or 
Thursday morning and I hope when I come back I will have my scalp with 
me.”119 Such a statement by the man who was one of the lead negotiators 
reveals deep governmental hostility toward the Sioux and accurately 
suggests that the meetings would not be true negotiations at all. 
In a similar vein, other news articles of that period evidence a lack of 
respect for the Sioux’s property rights. For example, one early opinion 
piece mockingly describes those who support the Sioux in protecting their 
land and other rights: 
                                                 
 116. Hoover, supra note 9, at 70. 
 117. See, e.g., Cash, Not Cattle. Sioux Indians Want Money for Their Lands, Not Broken Down 
Livestock, WINONA DAILY REPUBLICAN, May 28, 1889, at 1 (describing the Sioux Nation’s opposition 
to one of the early bills); Indians Can’t Agree. The Sioux Chiefs at Washington Split into Two Fac-
tions, MINN. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1888, at 3 (“It is said that they [the Sioux] are almost hopelessly split 
among themselves, and that there is slight prospects [sic] of their being able to unite on any proposi-
tion.”); New Lands for Settlers.; The Great Sioux Reservation in Southern Dakota to Be Thrown Open, 
supra note 90 (reporting that the Sioux and other tribes were being “forc[ed] . . . into contracted areas” 
as a result of the opening of reservation lands for settlement, but reciting that treaties had been made 
with each of the Sioux bands for the proposed cession); To Visit the Sioux, MINN. TRIB., May 28, 1889, 
at 1 (stating that the Sioux “are unwilling to sell the central strip of their reservation”). But see A Sioux 
Delegation. Indians Appointed to Confer with the Commissioners, DAILY ARGUS LEADER, May 20, 
1889 (noting that the Indians at the Cheyenne Agency had decided through their council to negotiate 
with the government’s commission and that “a large majority” of council members appeared to favor 
accepting the government’s proposal); The Sioux Reservation. Little Doubt that the Indians Will Sign 
the Treaty, MINN. TRIB., May 12, 1888, at 9 (stating that “[m]ost of the Indians, at least those of the 
Cheyenne agency, are anxiously awaiting to have the deal closed up and off their hands”). However, 
even the May 12, 1888 article contains hints that the Indians’ amenability is coerced; one Sioux man is 
quoted as saying “[w]hile the provisions of the bill are not in accord with our views in every particular, 
they are good and all that we could desire, and we must accept them as they are.” The Sioux Reser-
vation. Little Doubt that the Indians Will Sign the Treaty, supra (emphasis added). 
 118. The Dakota Oklahoma. The Next Big Rush Will Be into the Sioux Reservation., DAILY 
ARGUS LEADER, May 28, 1889. This article also notably states that “the laws of Dakota” would “be in 
force [in the area] as soon as the Indians vacate.” Id. 
 119. To Visit the Sioux, supra note 117. 
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These are the men . . . that are afraid to have the rations diminished 
for fear the Indian will go hungry. They oppose the giving of lands in 
severalty for fear poor Indians will thus lose title to the big tract 
which he holds as a reservation. 
If the bill needs any amendments to make it more effective in 
breaking up the reservation and leading to the abolishment of all 
reservations . . . then let the amendments be made.120 
Such articles demonstrate that those following the government’s 
attempt to obtain Sioux lands would have known of tribal opposition. 
Moreover, these articles also suggest the existence of a significant amount 
of public sentiment opposed to respecting the Sioux’s property rights.121 
Otherwise, the news commentator and commission chairman would most 
likely have been more reserved in their remarks. Moreover, while none of 
the articles I found directly described the coercive tactics used to secure 
the cession, several articles of the era conveyed the coercive character of 
the negotiations. 
Not all of the articles published before President Harrison pro-
claimed the Sioux Nation’s acceptance of the opening in February 1890122 
are as revealing,123 however, and many of the articles published afterward 
are mixed. For instance, an 1895 article simply announces that a large 
portion of the reservation is “now opened for settlement . . . under an act 
passed in 1889,”124 without mentioning anything about the Sioux Nation’s 
response to this development. By contrast, however, an 1890 article, spe-
                                                 
 120. The Sioux Reservation Bill, FARM, FIELD & STOCKMAN, Jan. 1, 1887, at 8. Farm, Field and 
Stockman was a Chicago-based paper with a circulation of 52,275 in 1888. N.W. AYER & SON’S 
AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ANNUAL 85 (1888). 
 121. Accord Hoover, supra note 9, at 73–74 (describing a prevailing non-Indian view during the 
allotment era that generally people did not have the right to more land than they could utilize and that 
Indians “had no right to keep any land of their own out of [agricultural] production”); Hoxie, supra 
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Sioux Reservation to a questionnaire by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in which the Superin-
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 122. PRUCHA, supra note 107, at 640; see also Proclamation No. 9, 26 Stat. 1554 (Feb. 10, 1890). 
 123. See, e.g., A Sioux Delegation. Indians Appointed to Confer with the Commissioners, supra 
note 117 (noting that the Indians at the Cheyenne Agency had decided through their council to nego-
tiate with the government’s commission and that “a large majority” of council members appeared to 
favor accepting the government’s proposal); The Sioux Commission, DAILY ARGUS LEADER, May 22, 
1889, at 1 (reporting on the Sioux Commission’s preparations for negotiations with the Sioux Nation); 
Where They Will Start In, DAILY ARGUS LEADER, May 22, 1889, at 1 (reporting that the Sioux 
Commission will begin at Lower Brule). 
 124. Land for Settlement, WINONA DAILY REPUBLICAN, Feb. 12, 1895, at 1. 
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cifically about the Cheyenne River Sioux, states that they “declined to 
give up their land to settlement when the question was put to a vote of the 
entire Sioux nation about a year ago.”125 It further reports that the Chey-
enne River Sioux view the opening of the area of the reservation in which 
they live as “unjust and cruel.”126 After commenting dismissively about 
tribal grievances generally, the article states that “it does seem that this 
band of Sioux has just and proper cause for grievance against the Gov-
ernment.”127 
Collectively, these articles show that, while ordinary readers may not 
have been on notice of the particular tactics used against the Sioux in 
effecting the opening of the reservation, many such readers probably were 
aware that the Sioux opposed the plans during most of the negotiation 
process, and at least some of them had information suggesting the Na-
tion’s assent was likely only nominal.   
3. The Rosebud Opening 
Before addressing the 1908 allotment and opening of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation in depth, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the 
slightly earlier allotment and opening of a related tribe’s reservation—that 
of the Rosebud Sioux. As described above, the taking of the Black Hills 
occurred in 1877. And in 1889, Congress authorized millions more acres 
of Sioux reservation land to be taken and sold off to whites and the divi-
                                                 
 125. The Sioux of South Dakota, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER, Dec. 20, 1890, at 
372. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper was a literary newspaper published in New York 
City that had a circulation of 33,450 in 1880. N.W. AYER & SON’S AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ANNUAL 
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Lands] (reporting that settlers seeking land on the Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Sioux 
Reservations came from as far away as Pennsylvania); Thousands File on the Rosebud: Many Wait All 
Night in Driving Rain to Register–Good Order in Crowds at All Filing Places, ASHTON CHRON., July 
15, 1904, at 4 (reporting that the first settler to file at Bonesteel for Rosebud lands was a man from 
New York City and that “[e]xcursions from Eastern points [of settlers hoping to acquire Rosebud 
lands] will reach this city [Yankton] to-morrow”); see also Winners of Government Land: First Luck 
in Rosebud Drawing Falls to Nebraska Veteran–First One Hundred Lucky Ones, ASHTON CHRON., 
Aug. 5, 1904, at 7 (reporting on the locations and names of the first one hundred settlers who suc-
ceeded in a lottery for Rosebud land; states represented included Iowa, Oklahoma, Missouri, South 
Dakota, Illinois, Kansas, and Wisconsin). 
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sion of the Sioux people onto smaller reservations, including the Rosebud 
Sioux Reservation and the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. 
The Rosebud reservation in turn was allotted in the early 1900s, and 
surplus lands were authorized to be sold to non-Indian settlers—without 
having been purchased from the Tribe—in 1904.128 Indeed, the Rosebud 
reservation was the first victim of Congress’s newfound power to take 
treaty-protected tribal land without tribal consent—a power that stemmed 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lone Wolf.129 In 1977, the Supreme 
Court declared that the portion of the Rosebud Reservation that had been 
sold off to non-Indians as surplus lands—the opened portion—was no 
longer part of the reservation. Thus, the reservation was held to have been 
diminished, based in large part on non-Indians’ presumed justifiable ex-
pectations.130 
Compared to the lands of the Cheyenne River Sioux, those of the 
Rosebud Sioux were much more fertile. And this fertility led settlers to 
vigorously pursue the Rosebud lands,131 while the later Cheyenne River 
Sioux opening did not generate a high percentage of settler filings.132 The 
large influx of non-Indian settlers onto the Rosebud reservation was part 
of the Court’s rationale for holding the Rosebud reservation to have been 
                                                 
 128. HOXIE, supra note 2, at 156–57. 
 129. Id. While the Sioux Agreement of 1889 purported to authorize the smaller reservations to be 
allotted in the discretion of the President, Agreement with the Sioux, supra note 115, at 309, § 8, it 
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 130. See generally Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604–05 (1977). 
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File on the Rosebud: Many Wait All Night in Driving Rain to Register–Good Order in Crowds at All 
Filing Places, supra note 127 (reporting that tens of thousands of settlers were expected to have 
registered for Rosebud lands by the end of the registration process for that opening). 
 132. Less than One-Fourth File for Reservation Lands, ASHTON CHRON., July 22, 1910, at 6 
(describing settler filings for surplus lands on the Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Reser-
vations after the lottery determined individuals’ priorities for filing). 
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diminished.133 Somewhat ironically, then, the fact that the Rosebud had 
more commercially valuable land that more non-Indians wanted and 
eventually acquired meant, in the long run, that the Tribe would have no 
rights over that portion of its reservation at all. Put simply, the widespread 
on-the-ground violation of the Rosebud Tribe’s rights was held to permit 
carte blanche violation of their rights of governance over that area in the 
future.134 
Articles about the Rosebud allotment and openings run the gamut 
from extolling the fertility of the land, to describing the magnitude of the 
land rush, to describing the expulsion of the Sioux from the area.135 In-
deed, several convey, to varying degrees, a purposeful displacement of the 
Tribe from its lands.136 Perhaps the most explicit of these is a 1904 
front-page article in Chicago Livestock World that reports that the allotted 
lands to which the Sioux were being confined after white settlement were 
“higher and drier” than the surplus lands that they were being forced to 
vacate.137 The article further explains that the Tribe was being effectively 
banished from its annual dance and celebration grounds, an area utilized 
by the Sioux “[s]ince a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to 
                                                 
 133. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 604–05 (relying on the fact that the area was ninety 
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the contrary.”138 The article also relates the comments of an Indian elder 
called Swift Bear, who “deliver[ed] a most bitter tirade against the whites 
for pushing the Indian into gradually smaller reservations, until, in the end 
. . . ‘the Indian will have no country at all.’”139 It continues by describing 
Swift Bear: “so great was the old man’s influence among his followers that 
the Sioux finally refused to sell the lands at any price and the government 
was forced to pose as guardian of the Indians and to take possession of the 
reserve.”140 
A more musing account of Rosebud lands that were opened for set-
tlement can be found in a 1908 article in a Nebraska newspaper—the 
Norfolk Weekly News-Journal.141 This article, which was written after one 
portion of the Rosebud Reservation was opened but before another portion 
was opened, was clearly geared toward attracting settlers to the 
soon-to-be-opened area. Accordingly, the article contains hardly any in-
formation about the Tribe itself.142 Nonetheless, the article is implicitly 
dismissive of tribal property rights and reflects a then-prevalent Lockean 
view143 that the Tribe should be considered less deserving of its property 
because it was not utilizing the property according to English and Amer-
ican farming norms: 
The opening of the Sioux Indian lands is developing them from that 
of the homes of indolent dependents of the government to the farm 
residences of thrifty Americans. The Indians who have been content 
to live lazily on the fertile soil and draw their liberal allowances will 
soon see more of their lands converted to useful purposes. 
. . . . 
One can drive over the range of Tripp county and see miles and miles 
of grazing lands and then return to the settled farm land of her sister 
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county and hardly believe that three years ago Indian tepees were the 
only residences. Yet it is true.144 
Finally, perhaps the least overt article I found that evidences approval of 
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s dispossession is a 1908 article in the South 
Dakota State Review. 145 It describes a new white town in the 
soon-to-be-opened portion called Winona.146 The writer expresses im-
plicit approval of the fact that, although the town was started on an Indian 
allotment (which had presumably been alienated to a non-Indian), no 
Indians remain in the area: 
The country around the new town-site . . . is rapidly becoming oc-
cupied with a first class citizenship right now, all of the Indian lands 
upon which patents have been issued having already been purchased 
by white farmers . . . , and the allotments which cannot be patented 
have been leased to white men for a term of years.147 
All three of these articles express, to varying degrees, a disregard for 
Indian property rights. The Chicago Livestock World piece puts somewhat 
of a rosy cast on the government’s property grab, and it contains some 
inaccuracies (recall that the Rosebud Sioux had agreed to sell the lands at a 
fairly high price, but that agreement was never ratified).148 Nonetheless, 
the information would have been sufficient to put a non-Indian purchaser 
on notice of a probable violation of tribal property rights. It describes the 
Sioux leaving the more desirable, opened lands for “higher and drier” 
lands and notes that the Sioux were being required to vacate their annual 
dance and celebration grounds. One can infer from this information that 
the Sioux would not have easily given up such an area, especially to move 
to less desirable lands. Moreover, the information about Swift Bear’s 
speech and the federal government’s having been “forced” to take the 
Tribe’s land would have directly put readers on notice of the possibility of 
unfair dealings and even outright theft. 
The Norfolk Weekly News-Journal article provides much less in-
formation about the government’s dealings with the Tribe but does evi-
dence the writer’s disregard for the tribe’s property rights and at least his 
own satisfaction (and quite possibly the newspaper’s) with the tribe’s 
dispossession. Finally, the South Dakota State Review article suggests an 
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attempt to create whites-only areas within the reservation. The writer’s 
view appears to be that the more whites and the fewer Indians, the better, 
which is a particularly problematic outlook to hold on a reservation— 
especially given that some of the land at issue still belonged to Indian 
people and was merely being leased to the white possessors. Thus, even in 
the South Dakota State Review article, there is a sense that Indian dis-
possession is a favorable development, a view that necessarily implies a 
lack of respect for tribal property rights. 
Finally, two other articles also bear on settlers’ expectations in a 
different sense. Two very similar articles that appeared in South Dakota 
newspapers in April and May 1908 discuss a conflict between state au-
thorities on the one hand and tribal authorities on the other regarding the 
authority of Indian police to make arrests in the opened area of the 
Rosebud Reservation.149 These articles show that the Indian police (which 
were then subject to considerable federal control150) did attempt to govern 
Indian allotments on the opened area of the reservation, a fact that is not 
acknowledged in the diminishment case, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.151 
According to the articles, Indian police arrested a Sioux man named 
Chasing Crane on his allotment in the opened portion of the reservation for 
having permitted dancing there in violation of an order of the Indian agent. 
When he was released from his sentence of ten days labor, he notified 
county officers in the opened area, who then arrested the Indian police the 
next time they were found in the opened area.152 Given that Indian police 
were generally closely allied with the federal government at that time, this 
was a brazen act on the part of the county officers. The longer of the two 
articles notes that the question of the authority of Indian police to govern 
Indian allotments in the opened portion of the reservation “may have to be 
determined by the courts.”153 But both articles seem to view the opened 
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area as not part of the reservation because they refer to the Indian police as 
having “invaded Gregory county.”154 While the articles suggest that the 
opened area was not commonly viewed as part of the Rosebud Reserva-
tion, an attitude that accords with the Court’s later rationale for holding the 
reservation diminished, they also evidence that there was considerable 
confusion about jurisdiction, at least in the early years—a fact that is not 
acknowledged in the Court’s opinion on diminishment. Finally, while the 
irony of a tribal citizen seeking freedom from federal and tribal control by 
enlisting the help of state officials is noteworthy, it should be understood 
that county and state officials in South Dakota appear to have been more 
often the antagonists of tribal citizens rather than their protectors during 
the allotment era.155 
4. The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation Opening 
On May 29, 1908, Congress approved the opening of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation,156 and President Roosevelt signed the bill three 
days later.157 By that time, an agreement with a tribe to open its reserva-
tion was seen as “superfluous.”158 Thus, although an attempt was made to 
discuss the federal proposal to open the reservation with the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe, Congress proceeded despite the facts that (1) few tribal 
citizens had been able to participate in the discussion due to bad weather in 
March 1908 and (2) the Tribe’s leader had asked that the Tribe have more 
time to consider the proposal.159 Additionally, those tribal citizens who 
were present for the discussion were told in no uncertain terms that Con-
gress could and would proceed without their consent.160 Thus, even if they 
had consented, it would have been under coercion, as was the case with the 
1890 opening. Finally, although many members of the Tribe later agreed 
to the originally proposed opening, the bill Congress passed created a 
much larger opening—a fact that rankled the Tribe.161 
It appears that the opening of the reservation largely resulted from a 
settler grassroots effort. This is evident from the fact that the Indian agent 
for the Tribe suggested opening the reservation in fall of 1907, but the 
Indian Office in the Department of Interior responded that that office did 
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not “‘take the initiative’” in the opening of reservations. Rather, it was 
considered better policy to wait “‘[u]ntil there is some demand by the local 
community or the country at large.’” 162  By December 1907, such a 
movement was apparently building. A South Dakota Senator and a Con-
gressman both introduced bills to open portions of the reservation that 
month.163 By January, in response to one of the bills, non-Indian residents 
of the former town of LeBeau, South Dakota, “passed resolutions re-
questing the extension of the provisions of the bill to include the whole of 
the [Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Sioux] reservations.”164 
Moreover, an editorial in the Daily Capital Journal the following spring 
portrayed an opening of the Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock 
Reservations as a key to economic development of the region, opining that 
it would pave the way for “‘the building of a great city right at Pierre.’”165 
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council objected to the opening 
almost immediately upon learning of the bills.166 And the council con-
tinued to object while the opening was being considered in Congress and 
after Congress had approved the opening.167 Importantly, at least some of 
the objections were reported in the popular press, as described below. 
None of these protests gained any traction with the federal government.168 
Even more troubling, it appears that many tribal citizens did not learn of 
the opening at all until they literally saw white settlers arriving.169 
While jurisdictional and other practices after the opening are of less 
relevance to the issue of justifiable expectations at the time of the opening, 
a few facts about life on the reservation after the opening are worth noting 
here. First, as mentioned above, the Cheyenne River Sioux opening at-
tracted fewer settlers than previous openings had. As a result, much sur-
plus land went unclaimed. But the best farming and grazing lands were 
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sold off to non-Indians.170 The federal government viewed this unclaimed 
surplus land as tribal land and continued to exercise jurisdiction over it, as 
well as over Indians in both the ceded and unceded parts of the reserva-
tion.171 Moreover, tribal police, rather than South Dakota police, patrolled 
the entire Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation both prior to and after the 
opening. And Congress, at the behest of the state, specifically provided in 
1903 that federal district courts would have jurisdiction over anyone who 
committed a major crime within any of South Dakota’s reservations.172 
Notably, South Dakota had enacted an earlier law attempting to cede all 
criminal jurisdiction to the United States for any violations of U.S. penal 
laws that occurred within reservations in the state.173 Additionally, federal 
officials in fact prosecuted non-Indians for crimes committed on the res-
ervation such as stealing from tribal members,174 and the local superin-
tendent of the reservation informally resolved disputes between Indians 
and non-Indians who lived near the reservation.175 Also, the tribal court 
was considered to be well functioning both prior to, and in the years after, 
the opening.176 These facts show that the opened portion of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation remained subject to considerable federal and 
tribal control after the opening, which should have alerted non-Indians 
who resided there that the opened portion of the reservation could con-
tinue to be subject to special jurisdictional schemes, including tribal ju-
risdiction. 
Several of the news articles on the Cheyenne River Sioux opening do 
not address the question of tribal consent at all and simply report such 
things as the small number of settlers who filed for land or the progress of 
allotment.177 But a substantial number of articles address the issue of 
tribal consent to some degree, and although the information is sometimes 
conflicting, the articles evidence varying degrees of tribal dissatisfaction 
with the planned opening. The article I found that provides the most 
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in-depth coverage of the Tribe’s objections is from a Twin Cities news-
paper, which is significant given that a sizable percentage of settlers who 
sought lands on the Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Sioux 
Reservations appear to have come from Minnesota.178 This article de-
scribes the objections of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council as 
being tied to the facts that (1) the Tribe had not consented to the opening, 
and (2) the opening would affect valuable mineral lands, the value of 
which had not yet been determined.179 It further suggests that the council 
was concerned that the proposed opening would violate its treaties with 
the federal government.180 Significantly, the article also explains that the 
council resolved to write to the Indian Rights Association to enlist its help 
in opposing the bill to open the reservation.181 
A 1908 South Dakota newspaper article portrays the Tribe’s views as 
somewhat more malleable. It describes the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe as 
objecting to the opening of a strip of land along the reservation’s “northern 
line,” but willing to agree to an opening provided certain requirements 
were met.182 The article closes with the information that the Tribe “se-
lected a delegation to go to Washington to get their views incorporated as 
part of the act opening the reservation.”183 
The Minnesota article is clear as to the Tribe’s objections and was 
undoubtedly sufficient to alert readers to the Tribe’s opposition to the 
opening—at least as of January 1908. While the latter article does not 
convey a wholesale rejection of the opening—or reflect that the Tribe had 
been told it had no choice but to consent—it does reveal that the Tribe had 
some specific objections to the opening. And one can infer that the Tribe 
objected to the opening absent incorporation of those terms. 
An article from another South Dakota newspaper reports that the 
Tribe’s delegation to Washington was successful in procuring many of the 
provisions sought, but that “about the only thing on which” the Tribe lost 
out was “the amount of land to be included in the strip through the center 
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of the reservation.”184 While this third article suggests that the Tribe was 
able to obtain significant concessions, it importantly conveys that the 
Tribe continued to object to the taking of some of its lands. 
Other articles are less definitive. For example, two very similar ar-
ticles in a Nebraska and a South Dakota newspaper concerning the 
Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Sioux openings report that 
Indians generally benefit from the opening of their reservations because 
the selling off of surplus lands makes them richer.185 Despite this ques-
tionable claim, both articles also importantly convey that the Cheyenne 
River and Standing Rock surplus lands had been treaty-protected tribal 
property: “The lands that have been thrown open to settlement came into 
possession of the Indians through treaties with the government and were 
set apart for their sole use.”186 The information that these tribal lands were 
protected by treaty should have raised red flags about the propriety and 
legality of the government’s taking of the land for settlers. Finally, the two 
articles acknowledge that hundreds of quarters of land will be leased to 
non-Indians by Indian owners.187 While the federal practice of leasing 
tribal and individual Indian lands during that era has rightly come under 
attack as unfair and abusive to Indian and tribal landowners,188 the pos-
sibility that non-Indians would be leasing tribal or individual Indians’ 
lands suggests that the lessees might be under some degree of tribal con-
trol. 
A much earlier article in the Minneapolis Tribune about the prospect 
of allotment (rather than a sale of surplus lands) on the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation also provides somewhat mixed information. It inter-
estingly (and perhaps fancifully) portrays conflicting opinions about al-
lotment among Cheyenne River citizens as a struggle between the rich 
mixed-bloods and the poor full-bloods, with the poor favoring allotment 
and the rich opposing it.189 While the article portrays allotment as just, it 
would have put a non-Indian reader on notice of dissension among tribal 
citizens about the prospect of allotment—often a precursor to the selling 
off of surplus lands. 
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An article in a South Dakota newspaper dated the day Congress 
opened the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation provides implicit infor-
mation about the injustice of the taking, though it describes nothing about 
the Tribe’s reaction to it.190 The article describes the land retained by the 
Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Tribes as very small in com-
parison to the amount of land being taken for settlement, a contrast that 
alone should have put readers on notice of possible foul play.191 It also 
alludes to “[t]he country to be taken,” which again suggests that the tribes 
are being acted upon by the government in this transaction, rather than 
having made a true bargain after negotiating at arm’s length. 
Finally, two South Dakota newspaper articles from December 1909 
and April 1910 appear to describe a plan to eliminate the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation that never came to fruition.192 The December article’s 
subtitle states, “No Reservations in South Dakota 10 Years Hence If 
Present Movement Continues.”193 This article thus contemplates a com-
plete end to reservations in South Dakota, but it importantly acknowledges 
that such a development is a possibility, not a certainty on which a 
non-Indian settler could depend. It goes on to report that a bill is currently 
under consideration for abolition of the Cheyenne River Sioux and 
Standing Rock Reservations.194 The article also notes that “the question of 
treaty consent of the Indians is no longer part of the process” of abolishing 
reservations.195 This information highlights the injustice that was often 
attendant on the taking of tribal land and the fact that treaty violation was 
also frequently involved. 
The second article reports—again, apparently based on a federal plan 
that was subsequently abandoned—that the Cheyenne River and Standing 
Rock Tribes had “reluctantly” agreed to sell off the remainder of their 
reservations.196 The article goes on to note that “the protecting hand of the 
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government will not be wholly withdrawn.”197  Information about the 
government’s continuing role would have provided notice of the potential 
continued viability of the tribes: their members would not be immediately 
transformed into ordinary citizens but would retain their special status as 
tribal citizens. The information about the tribes’ reluctance to let their 
lands go raises questions as to whether they had actually agreed to the 
cession. Finally, the article comments that, “from the standpoint of the 
state and of the public, there is every argument for breaking up reserva-
tions,” which are described as “serious obstacles” to development of the 
western part of the state.198 This last comment evidences disrespect for 
tribal property rights and a facile willingness to sacrifice tribal rights for 
the cause of non-Indian interests. Again, these last two articles pertain to 
contemplated changes that never occurred. But the articles are nonetheless 
interesting in their ready acceptance of injustices against tribes. Moreover, 
even these articles contemplating drastic measures against the two tribes 
make no guarantees about their eventual disappearance. 
5. News About Other Tribes During the Allotment Period 
My searches for allotment-era news articles uncovered several arti-
cles about the allotment and opening of reservations outside of my im-
mediate focus. These articles were also a mix of celebratory articles about 
the federal allotment policy199 and articles reflecting, to varying degrees, 
the injustice of the policy as implemented in individual cases.200 Notably, 
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a significant number of articles do directly demonstrate the injustices 
wrought by the policy,201 and several others reveal such injustices albeit in 
either implicit or equivocal terms.202 For instance, four articles discussed 
problems, including unlawful transfers and other injustices, that occurred 
during the implementation of the allotment policy, which, in three of the 
cases, threw the validity of the transferees’ titles into serious question.203 
One of the examples involves the Crow Creek Reservation in South Da-
kota. The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe is a constituent tribe of the Great Sioux 
Nation, although its reservation is also home to Sioux who were removed 
from Minnesota.204 An 1885 news article describes an attorney general 
opinion stating that an earlier opening of that reservation by presidential 
proclamation was invalid because the land was protected by treaty.205 The 
article concludes that “[t]he land has already been covered with entries by 
the white settlers . . . , but it is probable that the effect of this decision will 
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be to deprive them of any rights they may have acquired.”206 Putting aside 
the one-sided cast of this reporting, which incites the reader’s sympathy 
for the settlers but makes no attempt to foster sympathy for the injustices 
experienced by the Sioux residing at Crow Creek, the article would cer-
tainly have put readers on notice that non-Indian title to lands on reserva-
tions may not be secure in all cases, or—at the very least—that special 
rules may govern such title. 
Similarly, a 1909 Pioneer Press article described a planned lawsuit 
by the federal government against non-Indian buyers of allotments and 
their conveyees on the White Earth Reservation in Minnesota to enjoin the 
cutting of timber and other actions on the land.207 The article avers that 
timber lands worth a whopping $5 million are to be restored to their 
rightful full-blood Indian owners and reports that a “prominent govern-
ment official” has promised that “under no circumstances will the cases be 
compromised.”208 
A third article, from a South Dakota paper, describes the govern-
ment’s litigation to vindicate the rights of Indian allottees from the Five 
Civilized Tribes against “those persons who, by various means” obtained 
allotments from tribal citizens even though those allotments could not 
legally be alienated.209 
A final article on problems and injustices resulting from the imple-
mentation of the allotment policy is more indirect but has widespread 
significance. A 1910 article in a South Dakota paper describes a federal 
investigation into “the alleged graft in Indian lands” under the allotment 
policy and reports that “the accusations filed have just grounds,” “startling 
facts have been unearthed,” and the actions taken in response to the in-
vestigation “will be beneficial in no small way to the Indians.”210 
All four of these articles should have suggested to any readers that 
were considering settling Indian lands or who were in the process of doing 
so that Indians or tribes may have continuing rights to such lands in some 
circumstances. The fourth article also importantly describes how wide-
spread the problem was and would have put readers on notice of likely 
                                                 
 206. Id.; see also Squatters Have to Go, DAILY ARGUS LEADER, May 24, 1889, at 3 (describing 
the Indian Commissioner’s order to remove squatters from the Crow Creek and Lower Brule reser-
vations as “senseless”); cf. Agreement with the Sioux, supra note 115, § 23 (retroactively allowing 
these settlers a chance to perfect their land claims). Note that the page number for the Daily Argus 
Leader article cited here is uncertain because the microfilm appeared to have been scanned out of 
order. 
 207. Save Lands for Indians, supra note 200. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Will Try to Save Land for Indians, supra note 200. 
 210. Burke Is Reticent About Findings, supra note 200. 
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ameliorative actions by the federal government. And, in cases where the 
federal government opposed tribal interests, the tribes’ claims of injustice 
were directly stated in at least some cases.211 
The newspaper articles described above provide a sense of what 
information average non-Indian citizens were likely to have had regarding 
allotment and the selling off of surplus tribal lands to non-Indians, par-
ticularly with respect to violations of tribal property rights. Collectively, 
the articles tell us that non-Indians had imperfect and sometimes con-
flicting information about the allotment and opening of individual reser-
vations and, specifically, the fact that lands were being taken from tribes 
(and individual Indians) often without their consent and in derogation of 
tribal and individual property rights. In many cases, the information 
available in newspapers did provide evidence of injustice to tribes and 
individual Indians in the taking of their property. Moreover, historical 
evidence suggests that settlers were frequently instrumental in convincing 
the federal government to open reservations to non-Indian settlement.212 
In those instances, which included the opening of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation, such settlers were clearly complicit in any resulting 
deprivation of tribal property rights. 
C. The Meaning of “Justifiable Expectations” 
To fully evaluate whether settlers who purchased surplus lands on 
reservations had justifiable expectations that the reservations and tribes 
would disappear—thereby eliminating any possibility of tribal jurisdic-
tion—we first need to settle on a definition of “justifiable expectations.” 
The concept of justifiable expectations is often alluded to in Supreme 
                                                 
 211. See, e.g., Received as an Act of Courtesy, supra note 200 (describing a meeting between 
members of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes and the Secretary of the Interior during which 
several of the tribal members “declared that the agreement for the cession of their lands had not been 
secured by legitimate methods”). 
 212. See, e.g., HOXIE, supra note 1, at 47–49 (describing the public sentiment among the people 
of South Dakota, and so-called “boosters” in particular, that the large reservations in the state should 
be opened to settlement to make room for non-Indian economic development and quoting the Indian 
Office’s statement that it did not recommend the opening of reservations absent “some demand by the 
local community or the country at large”); Hoover, supra note 9, at 63 (describing the demands of a 
group of territorial residents who met in Deadwood, South Dakota, in May 1882 and urged that 
“‘[s]ecuring the opening of the Sioux Reservation to actual settlers, at the earliest possible time,’ . . . 
would be most beneficial to people in their quest for statehood” and noting that their statement was 
“[t]ypical” during that time period); Open Every Acre of Reservations, supra note 91; see also Kirk-
wood’s Report, supra note 41 (“Our people in their march westward have surrounded these reserva-
tions, and seeing in them large tracts of fertile land withheld from the purpose for which they believe it 
was intended–cultivation–have called upon the executive and legislative departments to make new 
treaties, new laws, and new orders, and these calls have generally been heeded.”). 
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Court opinions, but it is seldom defined.213 And even scholars examining 
the concept in other contexts have not tended to undertake stringent 
analyses of the meaning of the term.214 Thus, I will use other sources to 
elucidate the concept. Specifically, I will examine dictionary definitions 
and policy concerns, and then I will proceed to examine a philosophical 
definition of “justice” rooted in the work of Jürgen Habermas, as well as 
several approaches to justifiable expectations that are based on legal 
doctrine. The doctrine-based approaches include the following: (1) al-
lotment-era laws bearing on tribal jurisdiction; (2) an adaptation of the 
equitable defense of unclean hands; (3) use by analogy of the international 
law of state succession; and (4) use by analogy of the concept of inquiry 
notice as applied in real covenants and equitable servitudes law. 
1. Dictionary Definitions and Policy Concerns That Support          
Their Application 
The definition of “expectation” is fairly straightforward. The dic-
tionary definitions that appear most relevant include “anticipation,” 
“something that is expected,” and “the basis for expecting something.”215 
Dictionary meanings of “justifiable” suggest that reasonableness is im-
portant and further add a moral concept of justice. For instance, the first 
entry in the dictionary definition of “justify” is “to prove or show to be 
just, right, or reasonable,” and the dictionary definition of “justifiable” is 
“defensible” or “excusable.”216 Moreover, “justify” has the same root as 
the word “just,” a fact that reinforces the idea that “justifiable” has a moral 
                                                 
 213. Justice Blackmun’s suggestion, in a case addressing a due process challenge to revocation 
of a nursing home’s authority to provide government-funded services, that the Court’s understanding 
of “‘justifiable’ expectations” should be informed by “[r]eason and shared perceptions” appears to be 
one of the few attempts to define the term at the Supreme Court level. See O’Bannon v. Town Court 
Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 797 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Amanda 
Yellon, The Fourth Amendment’s New Frontier: Judicial Reasoning Applying the Fourth Amendment 
to Electronic Communications, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 411, 417 (2009) (interpreting Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), as creating a 
test for justifiable expectations). 
 214. Some of the few instances in legal scholarship where the meaning of “justifiable expecta-
tions” is analyzed in some measure include: Kristin M. Barone, Through the Looking Glass of the 
Fourth Amendment: The Unintended Consequences of Search Reform Leads to a Technological 
Erosion of Security in the Home, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 159, 177 n.110 (2011) (suggesting that one 
must have a right to an expectation for it to be considered justifiable); Daniel P. O’Gorman, Looking 
Out for Your Employees: Employers’ Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of 
Invasion of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 212, 245 (2006) (same); Yellon, supra note 213, at 417 (inter-
preting Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring), as creating a test for justifiable expectations). 
 215. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2002), 
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com. 
 216. Id. 
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component; indeed, definitions of “just” include “conforming to some 
standard of correctness” and “acting or being in conformity with what is 
morally right or good.”217 From these definitions and the word’s ety-
mology, we can glean that the term “justifiable” denotes reasonableness 
and that it is also logically tied to justice. In other words, expectations of 
continued injustice, even if empirically reasonable, should not be viewed 
as justifiable.218 The definitions quoted above tell us that “expectation” 
has a subjective component—in other words, the state of mind of a person 
with expectations is necessarily that of someone anticipating or expecting 
something—whereas “justifiable” is an objective standard that includes 
reasonableness and justice.219 
The understanding of “justifiable” as being tied to justice is also 
supported by important policy considerations. For one, it seems unfair and 
anomalous to hold that one group had justifiable expectations that the 
government would continue to thwart the property rights of another group. 
While the Court appears to decide Indian law cases at least partially on this 
very basis, such reasoning gives one group the right to impose govern-
ment-sanctioned harm on another group because the harmed group was 
historically subject to such harm. As a nation, we have definitively re-
jected this approach when applied to African-Americans,220 and it is now 
well-settled that this line of reasoning generally conflicts with important 
constitutional values such as equal protection.221 In the context of federal 
Indian law, such reasoning syllogistically and unfairly allows past injus-
tice to serve as a basis for present injustice, thus resulting in extreme and 
ever increasing under-protection of tribal sovereign rights. Finally, some 
commentators who have examined the concept of justifiable expectations 
                                                 
 217. Id. While under another dictionary definition, “just” simply denotes reasonableness, see id., 
when it is said in a legal context that something is just, the designation tends to denote a more lofty 
quality than mere reasonableness. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“just” as “[l]egally right; lawful; equitable”); see also Barone, supra note 214, at 177 n.110 (sug-
gesting that one must have a right to an expectation for it to be considered justifiable); O’Gorman, 
supra note 214, at 245 (same). 
 218. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201–02 & nn.13–14 (1976) (rejecting reliance on gen-
der-based stereotypes to support a law treating men and women differently despite the fact that the 
stereotypes enjoyed some empirical support). 
 219. Cf. Royster, supra note 56, at 643–44 (addressing only the subjective aspect of justifiable 
expectations). 
 220. See generally Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 221. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass . . . cannot be reconciled 
with the Equal Protection Clause.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its 
laws.”). Continuing to enforce the GAA in this way also likely violates the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 5.07[2][c] & n.518. 
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in other contexts have implicitly included a requirement of justice in their 
definitions.222 
As further explained below, these definitions and policy considera-
tions provide some assistance in determining whether the expectations of 
non-Indian purchasers of surplus lands during allotment concerning the 
possibility of tribal jurisdiction were justifiable. Although the newspaper 
articles discussed above contained some inaccuracies and certainly did not 
provide complete information as to the injustices inherent in specific tribal 
land cessions and the opening of reservations to settlement, they demon-
strate, collectively and often individually, that the settlers who bought 
tribal lands on reservations should not be understood to have had justifi-
able expectations that the tribes would disappear, thus eliminating the 
possibility of tribal jurisdiction. 
a. Expectations 
The first question is whether the news articles created expectations 
that the reservations and tribal governments would disappear, thus elim-
inating any possibility of tribal jurisdiction. In general, the articles cannot 
be read to support a federal guarantee or promise as to the disappearance 
of reservations such as would be entitled to the weight of an expectation. 
Some articles expressed a hope that such a contingency would occur,223 
and two South Dakota newspaper articles voiced a probability that res-
ervations in South Dakota would disappear within ten years if a pending 
bill passed.224 While the latter of these two articles did state that the 
Cheyenne Sioux had agreed to sell off the remainder of their reservation 
lands,225—a statement that may well have been interpreted to foretell the 
demise of that reservation—that plan was abandoned, and no lands were 
sold under that pretense. The same article also noted that the government 
would remain in a protective posture toward tribal citizens,226 a relation-
ship that could well entail special jurisdictional rules that could affect 
non-Indians in the vicinity of Indian landowners. Somewhat similarly, the 
articles about the clash of authority on the opened portion of the Rosebud 
Reservation can be read to suggest a diminishment of that reservation,227 
although one of them directly reports legal ambiguity as to that proposi-
                                                 
 222. See, e.g., O’Gorman, supra note 214, at 245. 
 223. See, e.g., Kirkwood’s Report, supra note 41; The Sioux Reservation Bill, supra note 120. 
 224. Indian Lands Are Disappearing from the Public Domain, supra note 192; Indians Consent 
to the Opening of 10,000 More Farms, supra note 192. 
 225. Indians Consent to the Opening of 10,000 More Farms, supra note 192. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Clash in Authority, supra note 149; In Conflict of Authority, supra note 149. 
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tion,228 and the content of both articles shows that the matter was not 
beyond dispute. 
In short, although many of the articles do suggest that forcible as-
similation of the Indians was the ultimate goal of the allotment policy, and 
abolition of reservations was implicit in this goal, very few of the articles 
can be read to support an anticipation of the abolition of any particular 
reservation. The only possible exceptions would be those about the 
clashes of authority on the Rosebud Reservation and those about the plans 
to abolish the Cheyenne River Sioux and Standing Rock Sioux Reserva-
tions, but, in the latter reservations, those plans of abolishment were 
subsequently abandoned before any meaningful reliance could have oc-
curred. Moreover, both of the Rosebud articles demonstrate some degree 
of legal uncertainty, and one of them directly reports such ambiguity. 
b. Justifiability 
Even assuming that such expectations existed, either in the case of 
the Rosebud Sioux Reservation or more broadly, were they justifiable? 
Under the dictionary definitions quoted above, justifiability has two major 
components: reasonableness and justice. Examining reasonableness first, 
the question of reasonableness overlaps with the question of whether ex-
pectations existed at all. Arguably, the ultimate success of the allotment 
policy was too uncertain to give rise to a reasonable anticipation of the 
abolition of reservations and the dismantlement of tribal governments. To 
be sure, such a goal appears to have been a widely held aspiration among 
non-Indians, yet assimilation was unquestionably an ongoing, somewhat 
gradual process, as reflected in the initial requirement under the GAA, that 
individual Indians were to hold allotments in trust for twenty-five years 
and in the news articles reporting on the progress of assimilation.229 
Moreover, the popular press reported some of the numerous failings of the 
policy, and those articles underscored federal support for wronged tribal 
citizens.230 Given that the abolition of reservations and the dismantlement 
of tribal governments were very much still in process during the allotment 
era and that there were serious, recognized problems in the pursuit and 
implementation of those goals, it is questionable whether non-Indian set-
tlers could have reasonably relied on their ultimate achievement. 
                                                 
 228. Clash in Authority, supra note 149. 
 229. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 2, at 10; The Bear Dance, S.D. ST. REV., May 29, 1908, at 3 
(contrasting the hardworking Cheyenne River Sioux Indians with the Indians on the Ute Reservation 
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 230. Burke Is Reticent About Findings, supra note 200; Save Lands for Indians, supra note 200; 
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A thornier problem for the non-Indian settlers, however, is whether 
their expectations, assuming they existed and were reasonable, were 
grounded in justice. In fact, as shown above, non-Indian newspaper 
readers were on notice in many cases of the fact that the tribes objected to 
the federal taking of their lands. Several articles discussed the trea-
ty-protected character of such lands. And some articles acknowledged the 
use of federal coercion and other unconscionable tactics to appropriate 
tribal lands. Even more problematic are the many cases, such as that of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux, in which the reservations were opened to 
non-Indian settlement at least partly as a result of the insistence of 
non-Indians living in the area. In numerous articles, a tone of disrespect or 
even scorn for tribal property rights is evident, which appears to have 
largely reflected popular sentiment231 and which similarly evidences a 
level of complicity. 
While the Supreme Court in Lone Wolf sanctioned the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to unilaterally abrogate tribal rights in 1903, even that 
opinion did not pretend that the course it sanctioned was a just one. In-
stead, the Court merely deemed the issue a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion.232 The injustice of the opinion would have been evident to anyone 
who understood tribes and Indians to have anything approaching the same 
rights as others. Indeed, it was subject to strident criticism based on its 
injustice from a contemporary senator who commented that Lone Wolf 
was “‘Dred Scott decision No.2, except that in this case the victim is red 
instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine that the red man has 
no rights which the white man is bound to respect . . . .’”233 Forming an 
expectation of freedom from tribal jurisdiction based on anticipation of the 
federal government’s continuing, unremedied violation of tribal rights 
simply cannot be viewed as just under an ordinary meaning of the word. 
Even if the unenlightened sentiments of the allotment era obscured the 
injustice for many people of that era, it is the quality of injustice rather 
than its historical perceptibility that is most relevant for our purposes. 
                                                 
 231. See supra note 32 and sources cited therein. 
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Because the Supreme Court is giving weight to these settlers’ presumed 
justifiable expectations in current controversies, it is fair to evaluate their 
justifiability under current standards of justice. 
2. A Habermasian Notion of Justice 
In his essay, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Consti-
tutional State,” Jürgen Habermas advances several ideas that are useful in 
developing a deeper understanding of justice in a multicultural society, 
particularly in one that includes distinct and cohesive tribal cultures that 
claim their own rights to sovereign governance.234 He explains, relying on 
the work of Amy Gutmann, that there are two core components to equal 
respect for all citizens: “(1) respect for the unique identities of each indi-
vidual . . . and (2) respect for those activities, practices, and ways of 
viewing the world that are particularly valued by, or associated with, 
members of disadvantaged groups.”235 He further explains that the goal of 
this second demand for respect is primarily to “protect[] the integrity of 
the traditions and forms of life in which members of groups that have been 
discriminated against can recognize themselves” and that “the failure of 
cultural recognition is connected with gross social discrimination, and the 
two reinforce each other.”236 Thus, “[a] correctly understood theory of 
rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the 
individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed.”237 
Finally, he notes that “the theory of rights” forbids citizens in a democratic 
constitutional state from “privileg[ing] one form of life at the expense of 
others within the nation.”238 
The goal of the allotment policy, as described above, was to destroy 
rather than to respect tribal culture. Indeed, politicians of the time made no 
bones about their intent to “kill the Indian . . . and save the man.”239 A 
central component of this plan was to alienate, forcibly if necessary, tribal 
property, so that Indians would have to learn to farm and to hold property 
individually rather than utilize the system of common ownership that 
accorded with their cultural traditions. Far from protecting the life con-
texts in which an individual tribal citizen’s identity was formed, the fed-
eral government sought to destroy those life contexts. 
                                                 
 234. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 
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Under Habermas’s view, then, the allotment policy was unjust be-
cause it was designed to destroy tribal culture, and the takings of tribal 
property effected to implement that policy were part of that injustice. 
Indeed, it cannot seriously be questioned that the allotment policy did 
exactly what is forbidden under a Habermasian view: it privileged West-
ern, individualized notions of property over the collective ownership fa-
vored by Native cultures with the goal of destroying those very cultures.240 
Furthermore, Habermas’s prescription of respect for minority groups ar-
guably applies with even more force in the context of federal Indian law, 
where the federal government has undertaken unique obligations toward 
tribes through treaties and other agreements as well as through its course 
of conduct, both historically and in the present. 
In addition to the insights about the allotment policy that can be 
gleaned from Habermas’s discussion of each nation’s duty to allow mi-
nority ways of life to continue, his explanation of individual rights sheds 
further light on the injustices inherent in the allotment policy. He writes 
that “[a] legal order is legitimate when it safeguards the autonomy of all 
citizens to an equal degree. The citizens are autonomous only if the ad-
dressees of the law can also see themselves as its authors.”241 The takings 
of tribal lands described above that the federal government effected either 
without tribal consent or with coerced consent did not safeguard the au-
tonomy of tribal members to the same extent that non-Indian autonomy 
was safeguarded. Property rights of whites, particularly white men, have 
traditionally been respected in the United States, but the allotment era 
demonstrates that this has not been true for tribes and Indians.242 Fur-
thermore, it is hard to imagine that the tribal citizens targeted by the al-
lotment policy could have seen themselves as potential authors of the laws 
implementing the policy (or probably any other federal laws of the period) 
or even that they would have viewed themselves as having federally 
recognized autonomy.243 In short, tribal citizens were not accorded the 
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autonomy of white citizens under the allotment policy, and this fact points 
squarely to its injustice under a Habermasian view. The injustice of the 
allotment policy means that those non-Indian settlers who benefitted from 
it and knew that tribal land was being taken by coercive means or without 
true tribal consent cannot have formed justifiable expectations based on 
the idea that the policy would be fully implemented at some point in the 
future. 
Some may argue that it is anachronistic and consequently unfair to 
apply a Habermasian notion of justice to both settlers’ states of mind and 
their actions during the allotment era. It is true that the allotment era 
predates Habermas, and the idea of protecting minority cultures was by no 
means prevalent during the allotment era. I do not view these facts as 
problematic, however, because my purpose is not to judge the non-Indian 
purchasers of tribal lands, but rather to determine whether their presumed 
expectations as to the eventual disappearance of Indian tribes should be 
given weight in current controversies about tribal jurisdiction. Because 
current tribal governance rights are at issue, there is nothing anachronistic 
about applying current notions of justice, even if historical expectations 
are part of this analysis, as the Supreme Court has made them. Whatever 
our nation’s previous failings, it is simply poor policy to continue to en-
force in courts of law historical expectations that are rooted in what we 
now can readily recognize as injustice. 
3. Cases and Statutes Pertaining to On-Reservation Jurisdiction 
a. Relevant Statutes 
During the allotment era, several laws gave the federal government 
jurisdiction over some types of crime on the reservation, such as crimes 
between non-Indians and Indians and major crimes by Indians.244 A sep-
arate and somewhat repetitive federal law, enacted at the urging of South 
Dakota in 1903, provided that the federal government would have juris-
diction over any person who committed an enumerated major crime on a 
South Dakota reservation,245 and South Dakota had previously passed a 
similar but broader memorial.246 Such laws provided notice to the general 
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populace that reservations were places where special jurisdictional rules 
applied. Reservations were not merely islands of Indian settlement within 
states; in an important sense, they were not part of states at all.247 These 
laws made no distinction between open and closed reservations and would 
have put non-Indian settlers on notice that they were buying land in an 
unusual place where special rules applied. While the statutes did not speak 
directly to the possibility of tribal jurisdiction, they nonetheless provided 
notice of the special character of reservation lands. Significantly, in South 
Dakota, the absence of state interest on reservations was even more acute 
than it was elsewhere in the country at that time: South Dakota had ap-
parently attempted to cede its right to try non-Indians who committed 
crimes against other non-Indians on reservations to the federal govern-
ment.248  
These statutes, by providing for special jurisdictional schemes on 
reservations and by making no distinction between open and closed res-
ervations, should have put prospective non-Indian purchasers on notice of 
the possibility that any lands they purchased on a reservation may be 
subject to different jurisdictional rules than lands that had not been taken 
from an Indian tribe. 
b. Case Law 
While the allotment-era case law is collectively somewhat ambig-
uous, some of the cases pertaining to jurisdiction on reservations provided 
direct notice of the possibility that non-Indians could be subject to tribal 
jurisdiction. For instance, a very early Supreme Court case, Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 249  suggested that non-Indians who bought land from tribes 
would hold that land subject to tribal law and custom.250 While not di-
rectly applicable to the context of purchases of surplus lands during the 
allotment era, during which non-Indians bought tribal lands from the 
federal government, Johnson importantly recognizes the possibility of 
non-Indians being subject to tribal jurisdiction. A few years later, in 
Worcester v. Georgia,251 the Court definitively described tribal jurisdic-
tion as exclusive within the boundaries of a reservation.252 
                                                 
 247. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating that tribes “owe no alle-
giance to the states, and receive from them no protection”). 
 248. See supra note 245 and sources cited therein. 
 249. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 250. Id. at 593; Tweedy, supra note 5, at 666. 
 251. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 252. Id. at 557; Tweedy, supra note 5, at 672 & n.95. 
178 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:129 
Although these early cases did not specifically address the question 
of how non-Indian land ownership within a reservation affects the reach of 
tribal jurisdiction, two opinions issued by the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in 1904 and 1905 respectively, 
prior to the opening of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, address 
that very question and uphold tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee 
lands.253 In Morris v. Hitchcock,254 the Court explained the effect of 
opening certain parts of the Chickasaw Reservation to non-Indian set-
tlement: 
[It] does not deprive these Indians of the power to enact laws with 
regard to licenses or taxes, nor exempt purchasers of town or city lots 
from the operation of such legislation. 
Purchasers of lots do so with notice of existing Indian treaties . . . . 
Such lands are sold under the assumption that the purchasers will 
comply with the local laws.255 
The Morris Court upheld the forfeiture of non-Indians’ horses and 
cattle as a result of their failure to pay a permit tax.256 Buster v. Wright,257 
an opinion of the Eighth Circuit, in which South Dakota is located, in-
volved a similar issue. There, the question was whether the Creek Nation 
could enforce its business tax on non-Indian, on-reservation landowners 
by shutting down the businesses of those who refused to pay. The Eighth 
Circuit held that such enforcement was proper and constitutional: 
[T]he jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not con-
ditioned or limited by the title to the land which they occupy in it, or 
by the existence of municipalities therein endowed with power to 
collect taxes for city purposes, and to enact and enforce municipal 
ordinances. . . . The theory that the consent of a government to the 
incorporation and existence of cities upon its territory or to the 
conveyance of the title to lots or lands within it to private individuals 
exempts the inhabitants of such cities and the owners or occupants of 
such lots from the exercise of all its governmental powers . . . is too 
unique and anomalous to invoke assent.258 
Remarkably, the Eighth Circuit enunciated this unequivocal holding 
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian patentees within the Creek Reserva-
                                                 
 253. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905). 
 254. 194 U.S. 384. 
 255. Id. at 392 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 256. Id. at 393. 
 257. 135 F. 947. 
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tion despite the fact that an agreement between the federal government 
and the Creek Nation provided that the Nation’s governmental powers 
would cease as of March 4, 1906, absent contrary legislation.259 
Thus, under the governing federal law in South Dakota, non-Indian 
settlers were on notice, at least as of 1905, that even if a tribe was slated to 
have its recognized powers of self-government nullified under federal law, 
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on that reservation would exist until 
that nullification occurred. This means that non-Indian settlers, after 
Buster was decided in March 1905, were on notice that they may well be 
subject to tribal jurisdiction until the reservation they chose to live on was 
affirmatively disestablished or diminished. In other words, even assuming 
that non-Indians moved onto reservations with the expectation that the 
tribes and reservations would eventually disappear, they should have 
understood the likelihood that they would be subject to tribal jurisdiction 
in the interim and that that legal framework would continue indefinitely if 
the project of allotment and assimilation failed.260  While other allot-
ment-era cases concerning what constituted Indian country may have 
caused some uncertainty about how the rules would be applied in any 
given case,261 the strong holdings as to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
in Morris and Buster would nonetheless have given settlers notice of the 
fair possibility of some exertion of tribal jurisdiction.262 
4. Unclean Hands 
In addition to Habermas’s definition of justice and historical law on 
tribal jurisdiction and on-reservation jurisdictional frameworks, another 
potentially useful way to elucidate the notion of justifiable expectations is 
to examine the equitable defense of unclean hands. This is a broadly ap-
                                                 
 259. Id. at 953. 
 260. Even if settlers had relied on the information predicting the disappearance of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation, see, e.g., Indian Lands Are Disappearing from the Public Domain, supra 
note 192, such information could not have been reasonably interpreted as giving rise to an expectancy 
as to lack of tribal jurisdiction. 
 261. See, e.g., Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 (1920) (holding that unsold surplus 
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plicable affirmative defense263 that a civil defendant can raise against a 
plaintiff’s cause of action when the plaintiff has “engaged in conduct that 
is in bad faith or violates other equitable standards,”264 and the defendant 
has been harmed by the plaintiff’s inequitable conduct.265 Although eq-
uitable defenses such as unclean hands were historically only applicable to 
cases in which equitable relief was sought, there is an emerging trend 
toward allowing use of unclean hands to defend against an action at law.266 
Despite this trend, however, the defense of unclean hands would not 
normally have any place in determining subject matter jurisdiction for a 
tribal court or any other court. This is because the question of the existence 
of subject matter jurisdiction is a metaquestion about the power of the 
court to hear the case, and this question is conceptually separate from the 
specific facts surrounding an individual claim for relief and the viability of 
any defenses to that claim based on the actions of the parties.267 Moreover, 
this Article’s focus has been on historical non-Indian purchasers of res-
ervation lands, not on current litigants, whose actions would ordinarily be 
at issue in adjudication of an unclean hands defense. Nonetheless, the 
doctrine can provide useful insights here because, as discussed below, the 
Court’s invocation of non-Indians’ justifiable expectations is properly 
understood as a reliance on equitable concerns to justify nonenforcement 
of a congressional directive. Because of this reliance, it is appropriate to 
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consider whether equitable defenses such as unclean hands have any role 
to play in the analysis. 
Taking the example of a tribal civil jurisdiction case, federal statu-
tory law, specifically the Indian Country Statute, supports application of 
tribal civil jurisdiction over conflicts occurring within an Indian reserva-
tion, regardless of land ownership or party status as Indian or 
non-Indian.268 Despite this seemingly clear directive, the Supreme Court 
has developed a complicated common law test for tribal civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers under which such jurisdiction is the exception rather 
than the rule.269 Even more troublingly, it tends to apply the test very 
narrowly and rarely holds that a tribe has civil jurisdiction over non-
members.270 Part of the Court’s rationale for applying the test and con-
struing it narrowly is its concern for the justifiable expectations of allot-
ment-era non-Indian purchasers.271 Thus, the Supreme Court employs 
these purported justifiable expectations as a sort of equitable defense to 
the mandate of the Indian Country Statute. But, given the historical in-
formation about justifiable expectations delineated above, which shows 
settler complicity in abrogation of tribal rights in some cases and notice of 
the federal government’s dishonorable dealings with tribes in many oth-
ers, current litigants should not be entitled to invoke the justifiable ex-
pectations of their predecessors in interest to avoid the directives of the 
Indian Country Statute. The fact that many such predecessors likely had 
unclean hands should vitiate current litigants’ ability to invoke an equi-
table defense on their predecessors’ behalf under the maxim that “‘he who 
seeks equity must come with clean hands.’”272 Buying land with notice 
that it had unfairly been taken from tribes or after having personally ad-
vocated for such a taking is surely “inequitable conduct” that is “directly 
related to the contractual relationship between” the federal government 
and the initial non-Indian purchaser so as to warrant invocation of the 
unclean hands doctrine.273 
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5. State Succession 
Another promising doctrine-based approach to justifiable expecta-
tions is the use of the international law of state succession by analogy. 
“State succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of one state 
by another in respect of sovereignty over a given territory in conformity 
with international law.”274 As a preliminary note, the federal govern-
ment’s recognition of greater tribal powers of self-government such as 
occurred after allotment had ended would not literally qualify as state 
succession from the United States to the tribal government at issue be-
cause tribes’ powers presumably remained very limited with respect to 
international affairs and because the federal government still retained 
significant power on reservations.275 Nonetheless, the situation of a tribe 
whose governmental powers were initially limited under the laws of the 
colonizing nation but then received expanded recognition under those 
laws due to a change in the colonizer’s policies is sufficiently similar to 
state succession (under which the federal power would literally be re-
placed by tribal power) to warrant comparison.276 Although state succes-
sion has been described as “an area of great uncertainty and controver-
sy,”277 it is generally understood that “[t]he new sovereign receives the 
same sort of sovereignty as the transferor has had, and this involves 
normal powers of legislation and jurisdiction deriving from sovereign 
equality and the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction.”278 An allot-
ment-era treatise similarly suggests that the successor state is normally 
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entitled to exercise jurisdiction over all those found within its boundaries, 
including foreigners.279 
The international law of state succession thus reinforces the idea that 
non-Indian purchasers during the allotment era did not have justifiable 
expectations as to lack of tribal jurisdiction. When the government of a 
nation or of a portion of a nation changes hands, as occurs with state 
succession, the new government has all of the ordinary powers of juris-
diction and legislation, and the citizens of the former government have no 
vested right to insist otherwise (absent a treaty providing such a right). The 
change in federal policy from one that oppressed tribes and sought to 
squelch their culture to one that attempted greater respect and allowed for 
greater self-rule is sufficiently similar to state succession through decol-
onization for the same rules regarding jurisdiction to apply. Moreover, 
protections currently exist under federal law for non-Indians and others 
who are subject to tribal jurisdiction, and these protections are similar to 
those that might be found in a treaty governing state succession.280 Thus, 
there is no practical reason not to apply the analogy of state succession. 
The fact that international law recognizes the jurisdiction of new states 
over the citizens of the previous states as a matter of course suggests that 
there is nothing anomalous about recognizing tribal jurisdiction in the 
similar framework of partial decolonization and therefore that historical 
non-Indian purchasers could not have had justifiable expectations of 
immunity from tribal jurisdiction. 
6. Notice Under Real Covenants Law 
As described earlier in this Article, the Supreme Court and individ-
ual Justices sometimes equate tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
non-Indian-owned fee lands within a reservation to a real covenant or 
equitable servitude and then posit that the servitude or covenant is invalid 
because the original non-Indian purchaser was not on notice of the possi-
bility of tribal jurisdiction. The conflation of the law of servitudes and 
tribal jurisdiction is problematic for a variety of reasons,281 perhaps most 
notably because, as the Buster court emphasized, other sovereigns’ gov-
ernance rights are not tied to land ownership.282 Nonetheless, the re-
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quirement of notice in real covenants and equitable servitudes law can 
help us assess non-Indian purchasers’ expectations. 
For a real covenant or equitable servitude to be valid, the party to be 
bound must have had notice of it at the time of purchase.283 As mentioned 
above, non-Indian purchasers had notice of federal laws supporting tribal 
self-government as of 1934. Purchasers also had notice of laws specifi-
cally defining non-Indian-owned land within a reservation as Indian 
country—making the land presumptively subject to tribal jurisdiction—as 
of 1948 (and continuing into the present day). That leaves the question of 
what notice allotment-era buyers might have had. While Buster and 
Morris provided notice that would appear to be more than sufficient, the 
newspaper articles analyzed above are another potential source of notice. 
The information contained in them was likely available to the general 
public through newspapers, other widely available publications, and word 
of mouth. Indeed, given the breadth of newspaper coverage about tribes 
and tribal issues (albeit usually from a decidedly non-Indian perspective), 
it can only be assumed that tribal issues were very much a topic of ordi-
nary conversation among non-Indians during the allotment era.284 
Because the vast majority of news articles discussed above do not 
relate in any sense to tribal jurisdiction, it is unlikely that reading the 
newspapers would have put non-Indians on actual, explicit, and direct 
notice of the possibility of tribal jurisdiction,285 although the articles that 
describe settlers’ advocacy to open specific reservations for non-Indian 
settlement arguably rise to this level. Constructive notice, which tends to 
be tied to the researching of a chain of title for a given piece of property, 
also seems largely inapposite here.286 That leaves inquiry notice. Inquiry 
notice is defined as “notice from the subsequent purchaser’s actual 
knowledge or constructive notice of facts which would have caused a 
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reasonable person to make further inquiries; a subsequent purchaser is 
deemed to have notice of all facts that such inquiries would have uncov-
ered.”287 While some articles cited are not sufficient to put a reader on 
inquiry notice of the possibility of tribal jurisdiction, those that describe 
tribal opposition to specific proposed land cessions or reservation open-
ings would have put potential purchasers on notice of the possibility that 
the land being sold had been unjustly taken from tribes, especially given 
that the land at issue had generally been guaranteed to the tribes through 
solemn treaties and that several articles conveyed this treaty-protected 
status. Other articles, such as those merely alluding to the treaty-protected 
status of tribal property, may have also provided inquiry notice. 
Non-Indians who were privy to information regarding tribal oppo-
sition, but who chose nonetheless to buy the land from the federal gov-
ernment, would have been on inquiry notice that the tribal owner might 
have some type of continuing claim to it in equity if not under then-current 
law. In some cases, the notice provided by the article may have been suf-
ficient to demonstrate the possibility of such a continuing claim in and of 
itself.288 With more ambiguous articles,289 some type of reasonable in-
vestigation, such as seeking information from the tribal council, the Indian 
agent, or the Department of Interior would likely have confirmed that 
tribal lands had been taken without tribal consent. The obvious difficulty 
for the tribe would have been enforcing that equitable claim, but even that 
difficulty was not necessarily insurmountable under then-existing law. 
Although non-Indian buyers may well have known that the Supreme 
Court had declared the federal government to have the power to unilater-
ally deprive tribes of property rights,290 this holding would not be deter-
minative of whether the tribe would ever have any power over the land 
whatsoever. First, as discussed above, the Lone Wolf Court did not make 
any pretense of dealing justly with the plaintiffs in that case; rather, the 
Court merely held that their claim could not be heard against the federal 
government in federal court. Whether their claims had continuing viability 
in a moral sense or might be remedied through other means, such as 
through a legislative enactment, was not addressed and such possibilities 
were certainly not foreclosed. Instead, Lone Wolf merely held that in 
disputes between a tribe and Congress, the tribe is basically at the mercy 
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of Congress.291 At the same time, however, the Court affirmed the con-
tinued validity of precedents supporting tribal property and other rights 
when the dispute was between a tribe and individuals or states.292 Thus, 
non-Indian purchasers who knew that tribal property rights were being 
violated also should have known that, although the tribe may not have 
been able to enforce its property rights against the federal government 
under the law as it existed at that time, tribes nonetheless had the option of 
trying to convince the federal government to change its policies and that 
the tribe’s remaining rights were enforceable against incursions by states 
or individuals. Indeed, allotment-era news stories reflect the federal gov-
ernment’s willingness, in some cases, to protect tribal property rights 
against abuses by others and further note the possibility of changes in the 
federal allotment policy that would be favorable to tribes.293 The news 
articles describing tribal opposition to the taking of tribal property there-
fore put potential non-Indian purchasers on inquiry notice of the fact that 
tribes may have continuing equitable claims to such property, and Lone 
Wolf did not foreclose all avenues of relief for such claims. 
Finally, tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction does not de-
prive a land owner of title, nor does it necessarily imply any special lim-
itations on land use. If it is a burden on property ownership at all, it is a 
modest one and in no way out of proportion to the grave injustices in-
flicted on tribes during the allotment era and their resulting equitable 
claims to some continued interest in their alienated reservation lands. 
It is important to recognize that importing the notion of inquiry no-
tice into the allotment context is not a seamless process. In the allotment 
context, it is not as though the non-Indian purchasers, by conducting a 
reasonable investigation, could have turned up evidence of an agreement 
under which the newly purchased property would be continually subject to 
tribal jurisdiction. Instead, the most that could be expected is that lack of 
tribal assent and other injustices, such as governmental coercion, would be 
revealed or confirmed through such an investigation. The imperfect fit 
between the notion of inquiry notice and continuing tribal jurisdiction on 
opened reservations is due to the fact that tribal jurisdiction is a creature of 
tribal and federal law and not generally an appropriate subject for real 
covenants and equitable servitudes. The reach of a sovereign’s police 
power is properly thought of as a public question, not as a subject for 
private transactions among neighbors relating to property use. Addition-
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ally, unlike real covenants and equitable servitudes, which generally must 
touch and concern the land to be valid,294 tribal jurisdiction does not in-
trinsically have anything to do with land use. Nonetheless, given judicial 
analogies between tribal jurisdiction and real covenants and equitable 
servitudes, it is useful to look through the lens of inquiry notice and see 
that non-Indian purchasers during the allotment era in many cases had 
“notice of facts that would have aroused the suspicions of a prudent pur-
chaser and caused that purchaser to make further investigations.”295 In 
this case, those suspicions would not have concerned restrictions based on 
real covenants or equitable servitudes but would have instead concerned 
whether the lands being sold were taken from tribes unjustly and whether 
the tribes might therefore have some continuing interest in the lands. 
Given the modest character of the incursion of tribal jurisdiction296 and 
the notice to non-Indians of a possible continuing tribal interest that was 
present in many cases, the recognition of tribal jurisdiction over open 
areas and other non-Indian-owned properties on reservations is a fair 
compromise. Applying the concept of inquiry notice also indicates that the 
test for diminishment should be rethought, and some existing decisions 
should be reevaluated because non-Indians’ expectations may not have 
been justifiable given the widely available evidence of injustice in many 
cases and the current laws supporting tribal jurisdiction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The newspaper articles discussed above demonstrate that many 
non-Indians would have had information to the effect that individual tribes 
objected to the opening of their reservations and further that many tribes 
had treaty-protected property rights to the reservations that were opened. 
Indeed, in some cases, settlers themselves advocated for the taking of 
Indian lands. Moreover, a philosophical definition of justice rooted in the 
work of Jürgen Habermas reveals the injustice of these historical takings 
of tribal lands. 
This information suggests that non-Indians who purchased lands on 
reservations in many cases did not have justifiable expectations that they 
would take their land free and clear of any continuing tribal interest. This 
is because knowledge of such injustice conflicts with the ordinary mean-
ing of justifiable expectations, and knowledge of an unjust taking should 
be interpreted to constitute notice that tribes may have some continuing 
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interest in the lands. Finally, (1) the relevant case law and statutory law of 
the time that had some bearing on on-reservation jurisdiction did not 
support the view that tribal jurisdiction was foreclosed, (2) the law of state 
succession raises the likelihood of tribal jurisdiction, and (3) the doctrine 
of unclean hands suggests that the successors of allotment-era non-Indian 
purchasers should not be able to benefit from the original purchasers’ 
presumed expectations. 
In conclusion, it is simply not accurate for courts to assume that 
non-Indian purchasers of surplus lands during the allotment era had justi-
fiable expectations that they would not be subject to tribal jurisdiction. 
This rationale for denying tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and for 
holding reservations to have been diminished or disestablished, should be 
abandoned. Instead, courts should enforce presumptions in favor of tribal 
jurisdiction and stable reservation boundaries, which are more in accord 
with both current statutory law and longstanding tribal expectations that 
are themselves based on solemn treaties and other intergovernmental 
agreements as well as on the federal government’s trust duties toward 
tribes. In other words, the ghosts of allotment-era settlers should finally be 
laid to rest. 
 
 
